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ABSTRACT 
 
Megan Melissa Cross M.A. 
 
Department of International Studies, December 2007 
 
University of Kansas 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the roles King Hassan II of Morocco 
played as a protector of the monarchy, a mediator between Israel and the Arab world 
and as an advocate for peace in the Arab world.  Morocco’s willingness to enter into 
an alliance with Israel guided the way for a mutually beneficial relationship that was 
cultivated for decades.  King Hassan II was a key player in the development of 
relations between the Arab states and Israel.  His actions illustrate a belief in peace 
throughout the Arab states and Israel and also improving conditions inside the 
Moroccan Kingdom.   
 My research examines the motivation behind King Hassan II’s actions, his 
empathy with the Israeli people, and his dedication to finding peace not only between 
the Arab states and Israel, but throughout the Arab world.  Critics question the King’s 
intentions in negotiating peace between Israel and the Arab states.  My research will 
show that while establishing peace with Israel and protecting his throne was a long 
standing goal of the King, his peacemaking efforts and actions in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute demonstrate that he was a messenger of peace and an altruistic leader.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Often thinking of the relationship between Arabs and Israelis, peace is not the 
first thought that comes to mind.  Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, 
Arabs and Israelis have been struggling to co-exist peacefully.  If policy makers are 
aiming at stability in the broader Middle East, it is crucial to focus on establishing a 
better understanding between Israel and the Arab world.  Morocco is one country that 
has recognized the importance of a strong relationship between these two groups.      
Morocco has put forth considerable effort both publicly and privately over the past 
several decades to improve relations between the Arabs and Israelis.   
  King Hassan of Morocco has been criticized that his main motivation for 
maintaining relations with the country of Israel, a quite controversial relationship, 
was the protection of the Moroccan throne.1  In addition to Israel, he created and 
maintained relations with various countries to create a more balanced Maghreb, (the 
Arabic name for the area consisting of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and sometimes 
Libya)2  and to improve the conditions inside the Moroccan state.  A need for this 
research exists because citizens, leaders and scholars have questioned the King’s 
sincerity and intentions for peace making, especially with Israel.  A leading scholar in 
the area of Maghrebi-Israeli relations, Michael Laskier, suggests that Morocco’s 
relationship with Israel was predominately used for eliminating the monarchy’s 
                                                 
1 Michael M. Laskier, Israel and the Maghreb: From Statehood to Oslo, (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 2004), 138-139. 
2 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (London: University of 
Cambridge, 1975), 1.   
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enemies, and not for the purpose of mediating peace between the Arab states and 
Israel.  
Looking at both Arab and Israeli perspectives, it appears that the relationship 
between Morocco and Israel was mutually beneficial, and the underlying objective in 
this relationship was to encourage solidarity between the Arab states and Israel.  In 
addition to this undertaking with Israel, the King’s actions in the Maghreb, Middle 
East, and the United States demonstrates his genuine concern for establishing better 
relations in the Arab world and beyond, but also for the citizens of Morocco.   My 
research demonstrates that while King Hassan had many reasons to protect the 
monarchy, his actions showed that he was a man who sincerely desired peace 
between Arabs and Israelis and was a leader that promoted better relations throughout 
Morocco and the Arab world.  More importantly, his actions show that it was 
important to him to improve the conditions in his country for the future of Moroccan 
citizens.   
 
TERMINOLOGY 
To ensure a clear understanding of the terms used in this thesis, “Arabs” or the 
“Arab world” or “the Arab states” will be used interchangeably and refer to the 
Arabic speaking populations located in the Middle East and Africa, consisting of 22 
countries (including Palestine).  The descendents or sharifs of Prophet Mohammed 
are given the honorable title of Moulay (literally meaning My Lord).  Additionally, if 
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the descendant’s name is Mohammed, Sidi (also meaning Lord) is placed at the 
beginning and the person is called Sidi Mohammed.3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used for this thesis was a historical reinterpretation of 
evidence based on primary and secondary sources in English.  The knowledge of 
French and/or Arabic is strongly recommended for the access of additional primary 
sources. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF PAPER  
The first section of this thesis consists of a literature review of perspectives on 
King Hassan’s actions and motivations for protecting the monarchy.  It also presents a 
historical background on Morocco, both before the French Protectorate and after 
Morocco attained independence from France in order to contextualize Morocco’s 
relationship with other countries in the region.     
Section two reviews the various arrangements King Hassan made as a 
mediator during the Arab-Israeli wars.  The main review of literature in this section 
will be from a leading scholar in the area of Moroccan-Israeli relations, Michael M. 
Laskier.  He suggests that a Moroccan-Israeli alliance was developed for the sole 
purpose of maintaining the King’s throne.  Other scholars suggest that Morocco allied 
with Israel (an ally of the United States) not only for protection of the throne, but also 
                                                 
3 C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (New York: New York University Press, 2000), xxxi. 
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out of the fear of losing millions of dollars in economic aid from the United States.4  
This section reviews Moroccan-Israeli relations and the role that King Hassan played 
as a mediator.   
By reinterpreting the evidence in section three, this thesis argues that while 
King Hassan had legitimate reasons to protect his throne, it was also equally 
important to the King to be considered by others as an ally to the Jews due to 
Morocco’s native Jewish population.  This alliance enabled him to arbitrate more 
effectively between Arabs and Jews because of his objectivity to both sides.   The 
initial alliance with Israel may have been a reaction to protecting the throne; however 
the partnership became a long-lasting connection that was beneficial for both 
Moroccans and Israelis.   His actions proved that he was dedicated not only to solving 
peace between the Arabs and Israelis, but also to improving the conditions in 
Morocco. 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
The Kingdom of Morocco  
 
Morocco is notable for its location, diverse population and natural resources, 
all of which contribute to making the country distinct.  Its unique location in North 
Africa positions the country as a potential peacemaking state.  The Kingdom is 
located as the western-most country in North Africa.5  Morocco is situated between 
                                                 
4 Mark A. Tessler, "Explaining the "Surprises" Of King Hassan II: The Linkage between Domestic and 
Foreign Policy in Morocco." UFSI Reports 3, no. 40 (1986): 8.   
5 Mir Zohair Husain, ed., Islam and the Muslim World, 1st ed., Global Studies (Dubuque: McGraw-
Hill/Contemporary Learning Series, 2006), 192.  
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the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and has been referred to as a gateway 
or meeting place, because of its neutral location.  Morocco is the meeting-point of 
Africa and Europe and is situated on crucial maritime routes (along Africa’s west 
coast, through the Mediterranean Sea and touching the Straits of Gibraltar in the 
north), making the country “one of the chief transit points of the globe, and in 
addition endowed with considerable natural wealth.”6 
Because Morocco is located on the African continent, some dismiss the 
location as lacking a Middle Eastern heritage.  However, the country has the second 
largest population of Arabs – the first being Egypt.7  Because of this, the King 
possessed the ethnic background to negotiate on behalf of Arabs situated in North 
Africa and the Middle East.  Morocco’s population is diverse; in addition to the Arab 
population, the country contains Berbers, Jews and Europeans.  In fact, Berbers are 
the original inhabitants of the country.  Berbers later converted to Islam.  A census in 
1947 (before the partition of Palestine) showed that the population in Morocco 
consisted of 8 million Muslims in the French zone, approximately 204,000 Jews and 
325,000 foreigners.8  The variety of ethnic groups existing in Morocco is a possible 
motivational factor for peacekeeping and it shows the country’s receptivity to other 
cultures.    
Additionally, King Hassan II’s ancestry can be traced back to Prophet 
Mohammed.  This gives him a religious obligation to unite Muslims around the Arab 
                                                 
6 Charles-Andre' Julien, History of North Africa, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1970), 271. 
7 William Spencer, ed., The Middle East 11th ed., Global Studies (Dubuque: McGraw- 
Hill/Contemporary Learning Series, 2007), 128.  
8 Stephen O. Hughes, Morocco under King Hassan (Reading: Garnet Publishing Limited, 2001), 23.  
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world.  It also allows the king to apply his religious authority as a method of 
reinforcing his power and advocating his political beliefs. 9  He is a member of the 
Alawite dynasty and is of Sharifian (sharif meaning noble) descent.  The dynasty 
traces their lineage to Prophet Mohammed.  This dynasty is a symbol of religious 
unity and of legitimate political authority in the country which allows the sultan to be 
known as Amir al-Mu’mimin (Commander of the Faithful).10   
In addition to the country’s location and population, Morocco contains two-
thirds of the world’s phosphate resources which make the country a rich resource for 
trading with other nations.  Morocco is the largest phosphate exporter in the world.  
Another important resource is iron ore deposits, which at this time remain 
underdeveloped.  There is a small but noteworthy amount of lead, mercury, nickel 
and antimony.  An additional part the economy is the fishing and agricultural sector.  
Morocco’s coastline provides a half-million square miles of fishing waters which 
accounts for 16 percent of exports.  Agriculture employs 50 percent of the labor force 
and is responsible for 20 percent of gross domestic product.11  Tourism has become 
increasingly important to Morocco’s economy and is an important source for foreign 
exchange.12  Economic relations are one way of opening communications with other 
countries having plentiful natural resources.  These resources are the focus for 
increased trade and in building relationships with other countries.  King Hassan II had 
the foresight to see the benefit of improving relations with other countries for both 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 289.  
10 Abun-Nasr, History, 228. 
11 Husain, ed., Islam, 195.  
12 Alan J. Day, “Economy,” in Europa Regional Surveys of the World: The Middle East and North 
Africa 2007, ed. Lucy Dean, 53rd ed., (London: Routledge, 2007), 832.    
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economic and diplomatic reasons.  He made alliances with many countries throughout 
his reign as King.  The most controversial alliance he built was with Israel.        
 
Protection of the Throne  
 Previous research shows that King Hassan’s relationship with Israel was a 
strategy to protect the monarchy.  The longevity of the throne was indeed a 
motivating factor.  The alliance with Israel was initially used as a strategy to protect 
his monarchial rights.  In the early years of his reign, King Hassan faced a number of 
threats from within and outside of Morocco.  Moulay Hassan II had legitimate 
concerns to stabilize the throne after being crowned King in 1961.  Civil unrest owing 
to his authoritative leadership was occurring inside Morocco.  During French rule and 
after obtaining independence, the Hizb al-Istiqlal (also referred to as the Istiqlal or the 
Independence Party) played a key role in political change in Morocco.  Anti-
protectorate groups that once supported the monarchy turned into resistance groups 
that demanded political change.  They called for serious reform in the governmental 
system. 13  In addition, several assassination attempts were made on the King’s life. 
Another concern for security was the conflict in the Western Sahara with 
neighboring Algeria.  Algeria supported opposition forces in the Western Sahara.  
Additionally, there was competition in the Maghreb for political dominance in North 
Africa between Morocco and Algeria.  Divisions in the Arab world were becoming 
more apparent.  President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt rallied Arab countries to 
                                                 
13 Alal al-Fasi, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa (New York: Octagon, 1970), 213.   
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support his radical and socialist ideas.  He abandoned the idea of an Egypt-first policy 
and used the struggle against imperialism as a way to gain support from other Arab 
countries.14  He ultimately divided the Arab states between radical and conservative 
regimes.  In Morocco, he sided with royalist opposition groups. 
To fully understand the motivations behind King Hassan’s attempts at 
stabilizing his regime and the monarchy, it is important to review events in the 
country prior to achieving its independence as well as the creation of the nationalist 
party and various political groups.  The system of government that existed prior to the 
Protectorate and before King Hassan ascended to the throne allowed the King a 
monarchial history.  The makhzan (literally storehouse) the historical form of central 
government that existed in Morocco was divided into two parts. The first was called 
the bilad al-makhzan (government territory).  This was hierarchical and autocratic.  
The citizens recognized the Sultan as a religious and political leader and paid taxes to 
him.  The other section was named the bilad al-siba (dissident territory).  It was 
known to promote equality and collectivity.  The bilad al-siba mainly consisted of the 
Berber tribes who were organized no higher than the tribal level.  Furthermore, these 
tribes recognized the Sultan as religious leader, but did not identify with his political 
authority and did not pay taxes.15 The importance of the Sultan and his leadership was 
built into the agreement of the French protectorate.  The French government 
modernized the makhzan.     
                                                 
14 P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 232.  
15 John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite - a Study in 
Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 17-19.  
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It was important to the French government for Morocco to develop 
economically, but the economic plan was the “structure on which the monarchy 
rested”.16  The current system of government was outdated.  The makhzan was 
implemented in the 17th century by the Alawite Dynasty and was firmly established 
by religious and political traditions.17  John Waterbury, a respected authority on 
Middle East political economy asserted that “contemporary political behavior in 
Morocco has been historically conditioned, or is at least derivative to a substantial 
degree from the country’s past and its traditional social institutions”.18  This is the 
case not only for Morocco, but for many countries around the world.  
 
 
The French Protectorate  
 
Prior to France’s interests in Morocco, leaders of Morocco were fully aware 
of the country’s susceptibly to outside domination, Moulay Hassan II noted in his 
memoirs that, 
the geographic position of our country, el Maghreb el Aqsa, ‘Land of 
the Extreme West’, best explains why it has been so greatly coveted.  
We are at the crossroads of seas, continents, peoples and civilization.  
This is why, in the 19th century, a number of foreign powers regarded 
Morocco as a strategical and tactical area of primary importance for 
their political, economic and military schemes.19 
 
                                                 
16 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 416. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 15.  
19 King Hassan II, The Challenge: The Memoirs of King Hassan II of Morocco (London: Macmillan, 
1979), 11.    
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The King had a legitimate concern to defend the historical monarchial institution 
against other dominant countries.  Despite the awareness, Morocco fell to foreign 
domination.     
After the French protectorate was implemented, it modernized the existing 
central government in order to generate economic stability and reform.  The first 
paragraph of the protectorate specifically stated,   
The Government of the French Republic and the Government of His 
Sharifi Majesty, anxious to establish in Morocco a stable regime, 
founded an internal order and general security, which will make the 
introduction of reforms possible and assure the economic development 
of the country… 
 
It also declared in Article 1 that the French government and the Sultan: 
 
…have agreed to institute in Morocco a new regime permitting the 
introduction on Moroccan territory [of such] administrative, judicial, 
educational, economic, financial, and military reforms as the French 
Government may judge useful.  This regime will safeguard the 
[prevailing] state of religious affairs, the traditional respect and 
prestige of the Sultan, the practice of the Muslim religion and [the 
operation of its] institutions, especially those of the habus [religious 
endowments].  It will allow the organization of a reformed Sharifi 
Makhzan [Moroccan government].20 
 
The protectorate was designed to uphold the religious integrity of the Sultan while 
implementing changes to the economic system.   
The French protectorate and the colonial authority’s actions led the nation to 
protest the Protectorate.  Nationalist groups formed when French authorities failed to 
include Moroccan’s in the country’s governmental system.  Moroccan’s eventually 
                                                 
2020 J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, 2nd 
ed. (London: Yale University Press, 1975), 551.  
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developed influential opposition groups in the country which threatened King Hassan. 
The first goal of the French colonial authorities was to “pacify” the central 
government. This was completed by a French military conquest and was termed 
pacification. Through their colonial experience in Tunisia, the French learned that 
working through an existing government was more advantageous than completely 
disassembling it as they had previously done in Algeria.  Although the makhzan was 
unstable and the Sultan was not able to exert authority in some regional areas, the 
makhzan had existed for a thousand years and provided knowledge that would be 
extremely useful to protectorate authorities.  The French ended the bilad al-siba and 
ruled by way of bilad al-makhzan.  This allowed the French to eliminate one section 
of the outdated government, and modernize the other section while still following the 
guidelines of the Protectorate.   
The pacification of Morocco took over 20 years.  France provided Morocco 
the security and stability to develop economically and established a modern 
administration.21  France’s objective was to expand commercial agriculture, industry, 
trade and mining.22  France made changes to the makhzan and developed the 
economy.  Colonial authorities did not actively involve the natives in the 
modernization process.  Initially, a movement of nationalism began because of their 
frustration with the colonial authority.   
 
                                                 
21 Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 33-34. 
22 Robin Bidwell, Morocco under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas, 1912-1956. 
(London: Franck Cass, 1973), 64.  
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Moroccan Nationalism  
The nationalist movement and the Sultan aligned to become a prevailing force 
in the struggle for independence.  The Sultan had occupied the Moroccan throne since 
1927.23  He saw the nationalists as a source to help him safeguard the integrity of the 
throne.24  The Sultan and nationalist leaders combined and now found themselves in a 
position to force change inside the country.  Nationalism inside Morocco eventually 
became powerful enough that the independence groups turned into anti-monarchy 
groups which posed a threat to the throne.   
The nationalist movement in Morocco gained momentum in May of 1930 
after the French protectorate issued a dahir (decree), stating that a separate form of 
tribunal law would be established in Berber populated areas to handle civil cases.  
This removed the authority of the makhzan and reverted to French law.  It appeared 
that the French were trying to create a divide among the Arabs and the Berbers. The 
majority of Berbers lived in the rural areas of Morocco and the goal of the decree was 
to isolate the Berbers from the growing nationalism in more urban areas.25  The 
outcome of this decree gave the nationalist movement the boost it needed, and the 
opposite effect of what the colonial authorities originally intended.  Various types of 
                                                 
23 C. E. Bosworth, E. Van Donzel, B. Lewis and Ch. Pellat, ed., The En cyclopedia of Islam, “Al-
Maghrib,” vol. V (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 1194. 
24 Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 49. 
25  Gregory W. White, “Kingdom of Morocco,” in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa, ed. David E. Long, Bernard Reich and Mark Gasiorowski, 5th ed., (Boulder: Westview 
Press 2007), 459.      
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citizens became involved in the movement, from intellectuals to traditionalists and 
skilled laborers. 26 
These groups calling for reform later developed into anti-protectorate groups 
that demanded full independence from France.  One of the first nationalist party’s 
doctrines was the declaration that, “Morocco is a country inextricably attached to 
Islam” and “Morocco is loyal to a royalist regime.”27  There were several movements 
with different names however, their goals were all the same according to one Istiqlal 
leader, “one movement seeking liberty, unity and rejuvenation.”28  Moroccan 
students, mostly French educated, called for a reform in 1934.  Initially, the goal of 
the group was to solicit changes to the French protectorate.  Despite their efforts, the 
colonial authorities dissolved the group in 1937.  Shortly after, the groups combined 
to form the Istiqlal Party.  It was not until 1944, that the Party represented the first 
effective political organization in Morocco.29   
Throughout this period, Moroccans showed remarkable unification in the 
country by forming an alliance with the Sultan. The Party demanded independence, 
development of a constitutional monarchy, education reform, restoration of Arabic as 
the official language, a new unified judicial system, social legislation, an internal 
security force, a taxation policy and better policies to improve relations in the Arab 
world.  Many leaders returned from exile and united with the reigning Sultan of 
Morocco, Sidi Mohammed ben Yussef.  They demanded freedom for Morocco and a 
                                                 
26 John P. Entelis, Comparative Politics of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press 1980), 33.  
27 al-Fasi, Independence Movements, 169-170.   
28 Ibid., x. 
29 Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 47.  
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constitutional form of government led by Yussef.30  The nationalists used the Sultan 
to induce the populations that would otherwise not respond to take action to the 
country’s threatened sovereignty.  To the citizens of Morocco, the only symbol of 
national unity was the Sultan.31  The nationalists helped build the reputation of the 
Sultan as a symbol of the Independence struggle; this also gave him the authority to 
act autonomously.32   
 The French protectorate which governed Morocco for over four decades 
incited revolutionary groups that posed a threat to French rule and showed a form of 
Moroccan unity inside the country.  The French population enjoyed a higher standard 
of living than Moroccans, and by 1953 their average per capita income was 20 times 
larger than the Moroccans. 33  This angered the Moroccan population because it 
demonstrated the colonial authorities’ exploitation of their natural resources.  
Moroccan’s individual freedoms were severely restricted.  For example, their usual 
movements from one region to the next were restricted whereas foreigners could 
travel anywhere.  Their houses could be searched without a warrant.  Furthermore, 
Moroccans needed authorization from the colonial authorities for public meetings and 
needed permission from the French Resident General to publish a newspaper or 
periodical in Arabic or Hebraic.  Persons of other nationalities only needed to declare 
their intentions.34  Finally, Moroccans were not given the opportunities to pursue 
                                                 
30 al-Fasi, Independence Movements, 217-223.  
31 Husain, ed., Islam and the Muslim World, 194.   
32 Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, 49. 
33 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 376. 
34 Marvine Howe, The Prince and I (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), 30. 
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educational goals and only a small number of them were allowed to participate in 
governmental affairs.35    
 The colonial authorities sent the Sultan and his family into exile in 1953 for 
their support of the pronationalist activities.  The exile outraged Moroccans since the 
Sultan represented the Moroccan Muslim community and was a key figure to their 
identity.36 Sultan Yussuf became a symbol of Moroccan resistance to the protectorate 
during his exile.  Late in 1953, Sultan Yussuf’s replacement was an elderly uncle, 
Mohammed ben Arafa. These acts fueled the nationalist movement.  By the mid 
1950s, Sultan Arafa resigned his title. Sultan Yusuf was reinstated and the royal 
family returned from exile in Madagascar in November of 1955. 37 
 
Independence 
Moroccans’ received their sovereignty from France on March 3, 1956.  The 
International Zone of Tangier was returned to Morocco.  It was not until several years 
later that Morocco recovered the territories controlled by Spain.  The greatest legacy 
left by the French was the transformation of the economic system.  Highways, 
railroads and deep sea ports were developed as well as the expansion of electricity.  
Although the improvements to infrastructure were initially made for Europeans inside 
the country, the Moroccans were able to take advantage of the protectorate’s 
economic reform in the long-run. 38  After his enthronement, King Hassan used the 
                                                 
35 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 376. 
36 Ibid., 391.  
37 Husain, ed., Islam and the Muslim World, 194.  
38 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, 376. 
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improved economic situation in Morocco to help build additional alliances in the 
West.   
King Mohammed V signed a declaration in late 1956 stating that a 
constitutional monarchy would be established in Morocco, and he would move 
towards a democratic state.39  The first step in transforming the newly independent 
country was for the Sovereign to replace the outdated title of sultan.  Sultan Yusuf 
changed his name to King or Sidi Mohammed V, to give the citizens a new way of 
identifying the leader of modern Moroccan politics.  The country was proclaimed a 
kingdom in 1957.40  The King formed a government of his own and the French 
authorities were replaced slowly by Moroccans.41  Like the traditional structure of the 
makhzan, King Mohammed V before his death, appointed his son, Prince Moulay 
Hassan II as his successor.  The heritage of the makhzan was handed down to the new 
kingdom as a “defensive preoccupation with survival”.42 The current ruling dynasty 
rules by the same traditions established by the Alawite in the seventeenth century.43 
The tradition of both dynasties included the collection of taxes, suppression of 
tribesman and maintaining the armed forces.44 
The alliance of King Mohammed V and the Istiqlal Party later proved to be a 
downfall for the nationalists.  Both King Mohammed and the nationalist parties 
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desired control the political system.  As the monarchy and the political groups fought 
for control, internal division in the government became apparent in 1959.  The Party 
associated with helping to achieve Independence, the Istiqlal, split to form another 
group, called the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular 
Forces or UNFP).  The UNFP said the Istiqlal Party had not succeeded in standing up 
to the King nor did they bring about economic and social reform.  The UNFP 
demanded the implementation of a constitutional monarchy.  The government and the 
cabinet, mostly members of the UNFP were dismissed by King Mohammed in 1960.  
King Mohammed designated himself as Prime Minister and his son, Prince Moulay 
Hassan II, as the deputy Prime Minister.45  The struggle for control of the political 
system continued after King Mohammed V’s death in 1961.      
 
King Hassan II’s Rise to Power  
King Mohammed prepared his son, Moulay Hassan, at a young age for the 
duties of a king.  The Prince was given a modern French education along with an 
Arab education that included history, language, law, literature, theology and 
philosophy.46  As a juvenile, he became interested in national politics and later 
became involved in nationalist activities.47  He received his law degree from the 
University of Bordeaux in France.  When Moulay Hassan was in his mid-twenties, 
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King Mohammed consulted him on almost every important political issue.  Moulay 
Hassan is credited with strengthening his father’s nationalist beliefs.48     
During the period of exile from 1953-1955, it was Moulay Hassan’s insistence 
to King Mohammed that influenced the exiled leader not to make any concessions 
with the colonial authorities. King Mohammed demanded his return to the throne and 
the country’s independence. 49  After attaining Morocco’s independence, Moulay 
Hassan became publicly involved in national affairs.  His father appointed him head 
of the soon-to-be national army.  In July of 1957, Moulay Hassan was named as the 
Crown Prince, the official heir to the throne. 50  While thoroughly prepared for duties 
of a king at a young age, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan did not expect his father’s 
death in March of 1961.  
After King Mohammed’s death, the power struggle continued between the 
newly crowned King Hassan and the Independence groups.  King Hassan formed his 
own government in June of 1961.  He surrounded himself with the same experienced 
political leaders who served under his father.51 King Hassan was not considered a 
nationalist hero, nor did he have the same charisma of his late father.  These two 
factors made it difficult for King Hassan to establish relations with people initially.52 
Nevertheless, King Hassan followed the same principles implemented by his late 
father, King Mohammed.   
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Following his father’s promise of a constitution, King Hassan implemented a 
constitutional monarchy in 1962.  It guaranteed political freedom however, the 
provisions consolidated his authority.  He had the ability to dissolve the legislature 
and had unlimited emergency powers.53  The constitution specifically stated the 
provisions that guaranteed his control of the government.  Articles 24-29 state the 
following:    
Article 24.  The King shall appoint the Prime Minister. Upon the Prime 
Minister's recommendation, the King shall appoint the other 
Cabinet members as he may terminate their services. The king 
shall terminate the services of the Government either on his 
own initiative or because of their resignation. 
 
Article 25.   The King shall preside over Cabinet meetings.  
 
Article 26.   The King shall promulgate a definitively adopted law within 
the thirty days following its receipt by the Government. 
 
Article 27.   The King may dissolve the two Houses of Parliament or one 
thereof by Royal Decree, in accordance with the conditions 
prescribed in Articles 71 and 73. 
 
Article 28. The King shall have the right to deliver addresses to the Nation 
and to the Parliament. The messages shall be read out before 
both Houses and shall not be subject to any debate. 54 
 
Although a constitution was established, the King remained in control of the political 
parties in the country.  This was a source of contention amongst political leaders.  
Following King Hassan’s ascension to the throne and his consolidation of 
power, division between the monarchy and the political groups became more 
apparent.  Riots, demonstrations and strikes occurred in the country.  The King was 
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unwilling to become a “constitutional figurehead” and the Istiqlal was reluctant to 
play a secondary role in the political system.55  As a measure of protection, the King 
began building the armed forces in Morocco.  Eventually, the King could rely on his 
own troops for maintaining order and protection instead of foreign forces that were in 
the country remaining from the French protectorate.56 
King Hassan maintained absolute authority in Morocco during his reign from 
1961 to 1999 as the Monarch.  However, two factors existed when he ascended the 
throne that complicated his role from the beginning.  The first was the reputation of 
the Istiqlal Party.  The Party was respected by Moroccan citizens because it was 
associated with achieving Independence.  King Hassan and the Istiqlal Party did not 
want to share power despite their popularity with citizens.  The second factor was the 
need for King Hassan to meet demands of a socio-economic plan in the country.57   
 
Internal Problems 
King Hassan resorted to violence by using the army to control the country. 
Article 30 of the constitution assigned him the duty of commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces.  Armed forces loyal to the King committed violent acts to calm 
political dissidents.  The growing dissatisfaction amongst his population led to 
multiple assassination attempts in the early 1970’s.  Several armed groups made 
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bomb attacks throughout different cities.58  Eventually leaders of the royal opposition 
group, the UNFP were arrested for "serious infringement of the law" and for being 
leaders of a "subversive movement.59  After their trial, some were executed, and it 
was revealed that widespread torture existed throughout their interrogation by police.  
Afterward the King reorganized his security forces and split the opposition parties.60   
King Hassan later stated that political parties were meant to gain support for 
the King, not formulate public policy.61  His firm attitude in the role of political 
parties merely promoting the monarchy was very evident and caused unrest in the 
government.  King Hassan specifically stated that, “I am aware that the leaders of 
political parties must preach their own doctrines; but their advice and expert 
knowledge is not always profitable to the nation as a whole.”62 The trend that is 
apparent here is that the King was not going to tolerate dissention among the 
opposition groups and he would use force to thwart these groups.  In addition to 
political unrest in the government, the King used the Royal Forces to protect the 
throne from opposition groups and from members of his own military.  Forces that 
were once loyal to King Hassan wanted to control the government and planned a coup 
d'état.  There were two unsuccessful coups in the early 1970's.    
Because of two failed assassination attempts, King Hassan needed to adjust 
his political strategy. During the 1960’s, King Hassan focused his energy in de-
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centralizing the power of the political parties. His only method to maintaining power 
was the building of the armed forces.  This later proved to be an oversight on his part.  
The first attempted coup in 1971 occurred at a celebration event.  Over 100 people 
were killed and 132 were injured.  Forces loyal to King Hassan eventually stopped 
the rebellion.63  A second attempt was made in 1972 when his plane was shot at by 
military aircraft fighters.64   The King was supposed to be the victim of a mysterious 
air assassination; nonetheless, he survived the second attempt on his life.  It was later 
revealed that the Minister of Defense, General Oufkir, and other senior military 
leaders were involved in both incidents.  General Oufkir allegedly committed suicide 
shortly after the second assassination attempt and the other participating army officers 
were either executed or sentenced to long prison terms.65  Though these acts were 
violent, and many people died, King Hassan suggested that his survival brought the 
people of Morocco closer to both him and the royal institutions.66  These acts clearly 
showed his need to protect the monarchy from both external and internal forces.  
 
 
Conflicts in the Western Sahara  
 
The struggle over the Western Sahara beginning in 1975 was an additional 
reason for the King’s concern for the stability of his throne.  King Hassan used the 
conflict in the Western Sahara as a way to realign with the political parties. Both 
parties agreed this was of national interest.  Thereafter, the legitimacy of the throne 
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was based on having a successful acquisition of the Western Sahara.67  If the King did 
not abide by this, it would be a threat to his survival as a political leader.68   What the 
King did not anticipate was the alignment of Algeria with forces in the Western 
Sahara.  The alliance threatened not only the Moroccan throne, but the stability of the 
country and the Maghrebi region.69 
  To better understand the conflict in the Western Sahara, it is imperative to 
review relations with neighboring Algeria and the actions that led up to the conflict 
between Morocco and Algeria.  The Western Sahara is located to the south of 
Morocco.  Mauritania and Algeria also border the area.  The area was once a Spanish 
protectorate, known as the Spanish Sahara.  During Algeria's struggle for 
Independence from France, Morocco provided assistance to the Front de Libe ration 
Nationale (National Liberation Front or FLN).  Morocco assisted in financing, 
providing military supplies and volunteers to the cause.  However, after Algeria 
attained Independence, relations with Morocco deteriorated because of Morocco’s 
claim to territory in Algeria.  The Moroccan government argued that the French 
protectorate made an error when drawing the Algerian-Moroccan border. In mid 
1962, Moroccan forces occupied an area that had never been defined by the border.  
By October of 1963, war had broken out between Morocco and Algeria.  A cease fire 
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was eventually agreed upon.  This led to the creation of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU).70 
The creation of the OAU in November of 1963 did not stop the fighting. By 
1967, there was a massive buildup of weapons in Algeria.  King Hassan requested a 
$14 million credit from the United States for weapons.  A memorandum to U.S. 
President Johnson from a staff member reveals the following information, 
The Secretary recommends you approve the $14 million credit sale of 
arms King Hassan has asked for. Bill Gaud would prefer no sale on the 
grounds that these countries can't afford drain from economic 
development and that we should be trying to build regional 
cooperation in North Africa--not get into an arms race. We all 
sympathize with his view but, with $180 million in Soviet arms next 
door in Algeria, it's hard to refuse Hassan permission to buy this small 
amount over 2-3 years. 71 
 
King Hassan was responding to Algeria’s aggression.  The conflict created long-term 
distrust between Algeria and Morocco.  It also widened ideological differences.  
Algeria moved both politically and militarily closer to the Soviets and Morocco 
moved closer to the West.72   
Periods of aggression occurred between Morocco and Algeria shortly after 
Algeria gained independence from France in 1962 and continued into the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Yahia Zoubir argued that one of the main reasons for poor relations 
between Morocco and Algeria was that “post-colonial, inter-state relations are based 
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on power politics.”73 Newly independent countries want to preserve their sovereignty, 
territory integrity and ensure their survival.  These conflicts originated from the days 
of their colonial experience and belief in the balance of power.  They handle threats 
by aligning with other countries in order to preserve the balance.  This is one of the 
reasons why Algeria aligned with forces in the Western Sahara.  Absorption of the 
Western Sahara to the Moroccan kingdom would affect the regional balance of 
power. 74   
Algeria’s support for the group known as the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) played a significant role in the 
reoccurrence of conflict between Algeria and Morocco.  The Polisario Front is an 
independence seeking body in the Western Sahara. Algeria disputed Morocco’s claim 
and supported the autonomy of the territory.  Morocco claimed historical sovereignty 
over the region.  The area was the starting point and headquarters for the Almoravid 
Dynasty (1062-1147, Morocco’s imperial period).75  The President of Algeria, Houari 
Boumedienne allowed the Polisario Front to establish a base of operation near the 
Moroccan-Algeria border.   
 Spain relinquished control of the Spanish Sahara in November of 1975 by 
way of the Madrid Accords.  The Accords gave the land to Morocco and Mauritania.  
Shortly after the Madrid Accords, Hassan led the Green March into the Western 
Sahara to assert Morocco’s claim to the territory.  The March was a peaceful 
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demonstration of 350,000 unarmed volunteers. The Green March did not stop the 
Polisario Front from declaring war in Western Sahara.  The day after Spain withdrew 
their remaining troops in February of 1976, the Polisario Front claimed the area as the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).76  
Algeria’s campaign against Morocco’s claim to the Western Sahara also 
affected bilateral relations and security in the Maghreb. Morocco was more 
conservative than Algeria.  Algeria was moving towards a more socialist government.  
Algeria stepped up relations with the Soviets and this was seen as a threat to the 
monarchy.77  It also affected King Hassan’s foreign policy initiatives in the Arab 
states because of other countries in the Maghreb aligning against him.  What 
originally began as a way to regain legitimacy to the throne later became a political 
trap in Hassan’s later years of rule.78  If a Polisario victory occurred and Moroccan 
troops vacated the area, this had the potential to weaken King Hassan’s throne. 79     
In an effort to stop the war, mediation groups began to develop.  By the mid-
1980s, over sixty countries recognized the legitimacy of SADR.  Despite this, the 
King had over 80,000 men stationed in the Sahara.80   King Hassan built a berm, 
consisting of seven sand walls.  By 1987, the sand walls extended more than 2,000 
kilometers.81  The walls acted as a protective system to fight off Polisario guerrillas. 
Manned posts were situated throughout the entire length of the berm.   The wall was 
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also secured by mine fields and was equipped with listening devices.  The wall 
ensured military superiority to Moroccan forces.82  
In an effort to end the conflict in the Western Sahara, Saudi Arabia acted as a 
mediator between the Polisario and the Moroccan government in spring of 1987.   
Morocco and Algeria later renewed full-diplomatic relations.  The United Nations 
(UN) eventually took part in the mediation efforts.  A settlement plan was approved 
by the Security Council in 1990.83 The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in 
the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in 1991. It called for a ceasefire and 
the creation of a referendum in order to decide the territory’s future standing.84  King 
Hassan later accepted the organization of a self-determination referendum in the 
Western Sahara.  He committed to a unilateral cease fire under the UN.85  The Plan 
was later delayed and to date, the referendum remains unsettled.    
 
 
Division in the Arab World and President Nasser  
 
Another concern for the stability of the Moroccan throne was President Gamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt and the division he caused amongst the Arab states.  Nasser 
ruled Egypt from 1954 to 1970.  He formed a union between Syria and Egypt in 1958.  
The union was known as the United Arab Republic (UAR) and replaced the existing 
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political parties in Egypt and Syria. The creation of the United Arab Republic was a 
triumph for Nasser’s brand of nationalism – radical and social change.   
The two countries were both closely aligned with the Soviet Union and other 
communist states.86    
President Nasser also aligned with King Hassan’s opposition leaders in the 
early 1960s.  Marvine Howe, a journalist and author, lived in Morocco during the 
French protectorate and covered the political situation for many decades.  She 
recognized Nasser’s threat to the Moroccan monarchy.  She stated specifically that 
King Hassan, “…viewed Arab Socialism, as personified by Egyptian revolutionary 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and its Moroccan exponent, Ben Barka, as the main threat to his 
regime.” 87  President Nasser posed an additional threat to the Moroccan monarchy 
due to his affiliation with Mehdi Ben Barka, a prominent leader of the UNFP.  King 
Hassan allegedly uncovered numerous plots by Ben Barka and his Party to overthrow 
the monarchy.  King Hassan suspected Ben Barka of aligning with President Nasser 
and Algeria during the 1963 border dispute between Algeria and Morocco.88  Ben 
Barka made treasonous remarks about the conflict in the Western Sahara and was 
condemned in absentia.89  Not only did King Hassan consider Ben Barka a threat to 
his regime, but coupled with his alliance to Nasser, the two combined forces 
threatened King Hassan.  The leaders who carried out the first coup attempt against 
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King Hassan were allegedly influenced by Nasser.90  Additionally, Nasser’s activities 
in Morocco and other Arab states caused division in the Arab world.     
President Nasser called for radical and social reform in the Arab, Islamic and 
African circles of the world.  Nasser envisioned Egypt as the center of three circles - 
Arab world, Muslim world and Africa.91  He had the ability to influence the Arab 
masses by his popular appeal. Nasser broadcasted campaigns throughout the Arab 
world and used the radio as an instrument of state influence and power.  Conservative 
Arab regimes construed Nasser’s charismatic leadership style as a direct challenge to 
their survival and legitimacy.  He provided advice and material assistance to dissident 
groups in countries with conservative regimes.  In the late 1950’s Nasser and the 
Soviets unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy.  They did 
succeed in overthrowing the pro-western Iraqi monarchy and for a short time and a 
communist government was implemented in Iraq.92  Nasser’s alignment with the 
Soviet Union provided a large build up of weapons in the Middle East and Africa.  
King Hassan stated his concern to U.S. Ambassador Harriman.  The conversation was 
recorded in a memorandum on November 9, 1966,  
The King shares the Shah's and the Ethiopian Emperor's concern over 
Nasser's aggressive intentions. … They look upon Nasser as a Soviet 
tool and watch with concern the military build-up with Russian 
weapons in UAR, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, and now Syria.93 
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Nasser played an influential role in the civil wars and revolutions in Lebanon, Iraq, 
and Yemen.  He was responsible for the civil unrest in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.94   
President Nasser’s brand of nationalism and socialism was successful in 
causing division amongst the Arab states in the Middle East and Africa.  By 1970, 
King Hassan was especially concerned with the new radical military regime 
implemented in Libya and the danger it caused to the stability of the Maghrebi states.   
Nasser had access to Libyan financial resources.  His growing influence in Libya was 
not a direct threat to King Hassan’s throne; but, it contributed to his apprehension of 
Morocco experiencing retaliation from Nasser.   
King Hassan expressed concern to the United States in January of 1970.  A 
memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon stated the following,  
The King would like the U.S. to use whatever appropriate influence is 
available to prevent Nasser's and Soviet plans in the Maghreb 
countries from succeeding. He feels that unless we take a positive 
interest in this matter, there is a real danger that the entire littoral of 
the southern Mediterranean, from the UAR to Morocco, is likely to fall 
to Communist domination. 95 
President Nasser’s alliance with the Soviet Union alarmed many of the conservative 
regimes in the Middle East.  This was especially disconcerting to Morocco’s safety 
because of the country’s close location to Egypt.  Preventing Soviet influence was not 
only imperative to King Hassan, but became an important factor in the United States 
policy after the end of World War II.   
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The United States and Soviet Union’s Involvement in the Middle East  
The United States and Soviet Unions involvement in the Middle East 
contributed to the ongoing conflict between the Arab states and Israel.  Prior to the 
outbreak of World War II, the United States was only involved in the Middle East in 
educational endeavors, church missions, and oil interests.  Once Britain’s influence in 
the area was diminished, Soviet influence increased and the American government 
was concerned with the containment of the Soviets.  The first policy implemented by 
the United States to review the threat of communism was the Truman Doctrine in 
1947.  Greece, Turkey and later Iran were offered military and economic assistance to 
prevent the spread of communism in the area.  The policy of containment was later 
extended to countries in the Middle East.96   
In an effort to guarantee the flow of oil and maintain stability, the American 
leaders wanted to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict.  In addition, they attempted to 
convince the Arab states and Israel to unite with the West against Soviet influence. 
The Tripartite Agreement was signed in 1950 by the United States, Britain and 
France.  The purpose of the agreement was to declare the powers’ opposition to the 
use of threat or force and also to maintain an arms balance.   The United States 
opposed the development of an arms race in the area; however they recognized the 
need for self-defense and internal security. Although American policy was to avoid 
the arms race, a pact in 1955, called the Baghdad Pact, essentially violated the terms 
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of the Tripartite Agreement.  The Baghdad Pact was a defense treaty between Britain 
(backed by the United States) and the countries of Iran, Iraq, Greece, Pakistan and 
Turkey.  The Pact was designed to prevent the spread of communism but bypassed 
the Arab League.  The Pact angered President Nasser and in turn, he aligned with the 
Soviets by purchasing large quantities of weapons in September of 1955.97  When the 
pro-western monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in 1958, Iraq withdrew from the Pact.   
The Baghdad Pact became known as the Central Treaty Organization (Cento) and was 
headquartered in Ankara, Turkey.98  To maintain an arms balance between the radical 
and conservative regimes in the Middle East, the United States supplied weapons to 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, two countries considered more conservative.  
While Morocco is now considered a conservative regime, the country 
implemented a non-alignment policy in the late 1950’s and early 1960s.  The 
Moroccan government preferred not to take an East or West position.  American 
government files indicate that,  
…it was a well-known Moroccan policy to establish no exclusive 
relations with the East or West, particularly with the matter of arms, 
and that Morocco reserved the right to acquire arms it needed from any 
available source.99   
Morocco acquired small arms from the Soviet Union.  The United States denied 
previous attempts from Morocco to gain arms.  The American government recognized 
the importance of maintaining their military bases in Morocco built during the French 
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protectorate.  They offered arms and economic aid as bargaining tools to King Hassan 
in order to steer the King away from Soviet influence.  In 1963, King Hassan notified 
the United States he was ready for improved economic and military relations with the 
West.100   
 The Arab-Israeli conflict was not a byproduct of the Cold War.  The conflict 
existed prior to the rising tensions between the East and the West.  The United States 
and Soviet Union’s involvement only prolonged the conflict.  The superpowers’ 
interests made peace between the Arab states and Israel harder to attain.  The 
following section on the Arab-Israeli wars will briefly discuss the conflicts.    
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 
 
King Hassan II of Morocco played a role as an intermediary between the 
Arabs and Israelis in the latter part of the Arab-Israeli Wars.  The next section 
provides a short summary of the wars.  It establishes the context surrounding the 
creation of the state of Israel and the resulting conflicts.  King Hassan played an 
important role as an intermediary for the achievement of peace in the Middle East.  
His actions as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute did not actually begin until the 
late 1970s, but he continued to mediate until his death in 1999.  Morocco became in 
important actor in resolving the decade’s long conflict.  The conflict between Arabs 
and Israelis has often been the center of international attention since the end of World 
War I.  Extensive information about the Arab-Israeli conflicts has been published all 
over the world so the information here will be brief yet concise.   
Palestine was important to three religious groups, Jews, Christians and 
Muslims.  Jewish claims to the land are from ancient Biblical times.  Many events in 
the Christian Old Testament occurred in Palestine and the area became the center of 
Jewish practices, traditions and customs.  Palestine is referred to the Promised Land 
by Jews.  To Christians, Jesus Christ was born and raised in Palestine.  His death also 
occurred on the land.  Most of the events recorded in the New Testament occurred in 
Palestine.  To Muslims, the land is important because Palestine was conquered 1,300 
years ago by Arab and Islamic tribes after the death of Prophet Mohammed.  The 
Prophet first designated Jerusalem as the direction to which Muslims pray (qibla).  
The qibla now is in Mecca, Saudia Arabia.  Muslims believe that Prophet Mohammed 
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ascended to heaven from King Solomon’s temple.  That site is now the area known as 
the Dome of the Rock is located in Jerusalem.  When the Ottomans conquered the 
area in 1517, the area was mostly populated with Arabic speaking Muslims.101   
Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1917.  During this 
time, the country did not appear on the map as a single unit.  The immediate and 
surrounding areas were divided into vilayets (provinces) and sanjaks (districts). 102  
Prior to the Ottomans, there were various dynasties in Palestine including the 
Egyptians, Canaanites, Persians and Romans and a range of other dynasties.  
However, it was during the Ottoman Empire in the late 1800’s, that Jews began 
migrating to Palestine.  Most of the world’s Jewish population lived in Europe and 
wanted to escape poor economic and social conditions.103  The Jews were “a nation 
without a land” and movements to secure a homeland were pursued.104  Hoveve Zion 
was the founder of one of the first movements.  Some years later, several groups 
formed into one world Zionist organization, founded by Theodore Herzl.105  
 The central focus of the struggle was on Zionism, or Jewish nationalism 
versus Arab nationalism for control over Palestine. An official World Zionist 
Movement was developed in 1897 and the movement officially declared “the aim of 
Zionism is to create for the Jewish People a home in Palestine secured by Public 
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Law.”106  Waves of Jewish migration (aliyah) to Palestine began in the late 1800’s.   
When the first Jewish settlement settled in 1880, conflict ensued between the Arabs 
and Israelis over land and crop issues.  The Palestinian Arabs requested that the 
Ottomans limit migration, but the immigration movement was too popular to stop.   
After World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine became a 
British mandate.  The mandate lasted over 30 years and it was during those years that 
the mandate made concessions to both Arabs and Jews.107  In 1920’s and 1930’s 
Britain attempted to establish self-governing institutions in Palestine, but their efforts 
failed due to the differing opinions of Arabs and Jews.  Arabs rejected the Jews’ 
historical claim to Palestine.108  The conflict entered a new phase when World War II 
broke out in 1939.  An agreement by Britain in September of 1939, known as the 
White Paper, limited Jewish migration to Palestine.  There was a series of 
conferences, correspondence, and declarations between the three parties that existed 
throughout the early 1930s and through the late 1940s.  Illegal and underground 
migration of Jews to Palestine occurred as a result of the Holocaust.  By the end of 
World War II, six million or 90 percent of the Jewish population in Europe had been 
methodically exterminated.109   
After the Second World War, the British government was occupied with 
economic problems inside their homeland.  The economic situation, coupled with the 
problems of placing dislocated Jews forced Britain to reconsider the mandate.  In 
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early 1947, Britain terminated the mandate in Palestine and turned the issue over to 
the United Nations.110 The UN General Assembly voted 33:13 to support the creation 
of Israel (10 countries abstained and one country was absent). The new Jewish state, 
hereafter known as Israel, was partitioned in November of 1947.  The United States 
and the Soviet Union were among supporters of the partition plan.111   
The conflict between the Arabs and Israelis resulted in a range of wars and 
uprisings from the late 1940s to the 1990s.  The focus of the paper will be on the 
following conflicts:   
1) The War of Independence - 1948 
2) The Suez War or Sinai Campaign - 1956 
3) The Six-Day War - 1967 
4) Wars of Attrition - 1969-1970 
5) The Yom Kippur War - 1973 
6) Operation Peace for Gailiee - 1982 
7) Intifada - 1987 
8) The Gulf War - 1990 
 
Morocco played a role in moderating between the Arab states and Israel.  Two of the 
wars occurred before King Hassan assumed leadership in Morocco.  King Hassan 
played an active role in moderating between the radical Arab states and the 
conservative Arab regimes beginning in the 1960s.  However, it was not until after 
the 1973 war that King Hassan mediated between Israel and the Arab states.   
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War of Independence – May 15, 1948  
Israel’s War of Independence began after the termination of the British 
mandate.  The Arab states rejected the UN partition plan and the armies of Egypt, 
Syria, Transjordan (now Jordan), Iraq and Lebanon invaded the new Jewish state.  
The Arab forces tried to regain the territory by force.  Israeli forces were 
outnumbered and they were surrounded by Arabs, however, the Arab armies did not 
show unification and were disorganized.  The Israelis captured part of Jerusalem, a 
city that they were not originally allocated in the Mandate.  The war enlarged and 
solidified the Israeli state.  The fighting stopped when Israel and Egypt signed a cease 
fire agreement at the beginning of 1949.112  The new state of Israel claimed victory.   
 The legacy of the war for the Arabs was the extinction of the Palestinians 
from Israel and their displacement throughout other Arab countries.  Three-quarters 
of a million Palestinian Arabs became refugees and Israel never let them return to 
their country.  Arab states such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq received 
Palestinians refugees into their countries.  However, the majority of refugees went to 
the eastern portion of Palestine or to camps in the Gaza region.  This eastern area in 
Palestine was controlled by the Arab Legion and Transjordan.113  Part of the Arab 
armies’ failure was due to logistical and organizational difficulties.114 The defeat of 
the war highlighted the current state of disorganization in the Arab armies.  At the 
time of the war, Egypt was considered the most powerful Arab country.  However, 
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the Egyptian Monarch, King Faruq, had no prior experience in commanding a war 
nor had his forces ever participated in a war.   
Inter-war period  
The War of Independence accelerated the fall of the monarchy in Egypt. King 
Faruq was overthrown in 1952.  General Neguib and the Free Officers, members of 
Egypt’s army (including Nasser, a Colonel at the time), participated in a bloodless 
coup and assumed power of Egypt in July of 1952.  Neguib was a figurehead for 
Nasser and after March 1954, Nasser was the effective leader of Egypt.115  The 
Baghdad Pact was signed by Iran, Iraq, Greece, Pakistan and Turkey.  Iraq was 
Egypt’s rival enemy.  Nasser saw the Pact as a way for Iraq to steal leadership of the 
Arab world away from Nasser.116  He secured large amounts of arms from the Soviet 
Union beginning in 1955.117  To Nasser, Israel was a larger threat than the Soviet 
Union.  He assumed the role as President of Egypt in 1956, shortly before he 
nationalized the Suez Canal. 
 
 
The Suez War or Sinai Campaign - October 29, 1956  
  
The main catalyst for the second Arab-Israeli War was the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt.  Britain and France were large 
shareholders in the Suez Canal Company.  The canal was a major strategic asset for 
Britain due to the large amount of ships that passed through the canal. France and 
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Israel became allies as a result of Egypt’s support for the Algerian rebels fighting for 
their country’s independence from France.  France became Israel’s main supplier of 
weapons.  When Egypt refused Israeli ships’ access to the Suez Canal, it was seen as 
an act of war.  Israel launched the Sinai campaign with joint effort from Britain and 
France.   The collusion was unbeknownst to the United States.  Israel seized the Sinai 
Peninsula within 100 hours.118  After British and French forces invaded Egypt, 
Morocco severed relations with France.119  The United Nations Security Council 
called for a cease-fire, but Britain and France vetoed the measure twice.  With 
pressure from the United States, Israel withdrew its forces from the Sinai.  The United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created and some territory was put under its 
control.  
The outcome of the war was that Israel proved they were strong militarily by 
defeating Egypt, the country considered the Arab’s strongest nation.120  However, the 
war was considered a diplomatic defeat for Britain and France.  Their agreement with 
Israel undermined relations with the Third World and the United States. 121  For 
President Nasser, the war was a turning point for his leadership.  His focus shifted 
from domestic policy in Egypt to Arab nationalism and Egypt was the model and 
leader of radical forces throughout the Arab world.  Nasser became the symbol of 
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pan-Arabism. 122 Pan-Arabism opposed colonialism and foreign interference in the 
Arab world.    
Inter-war period  
During this period, Egypt and Syria aligned to form the United Arab Republic.  
The United States policy was guided by the Eisenhower Doctrine in an effort to 
prevent the spread of international communism.  The Doctrine stated that the 
President could approve economic and military aid to any country in the Middle East 
that was concerned with the threat of Soviet influence.  However to Arabs, the threat 
of Zionism was a far more serious concern than communism. The Soviets re-supplied 
the radical regimes of Egypt Syria and Iraq with weapons.  For the first time, in 1962, 
the United States sold missiles and tanks to Israel.123   
In September 1964, an Arab Summit Conference in Cairo called for the 
diversion of the Jordan headwaters.  Israel received two-thirds of its water from the 
Jordan River.  The Conference also voted on the creation of a Palestinian movement 
organization.  They called it the Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO).124  The PLO 
was an instrument of Arab regimes and was not active prior to the Six Day War.  In 
1966, al-Fatah, a group formed by Palestinian students in Cairo, including Yasser 
Arafat, aligned with the PLO.  The two groups launched attacks from the Syrian and 
Jordanian borders on Israel.  The attacks by al-Fatah and the PLO contributed to the 
outbreak of the next Arab-Israeli war.125  
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Six-Day War - June 5,1967  
 The third Arab-Israeli War began when Israel launched a preemptive attack on 
Egypt.  The war started on a false rumor from Russia.  The Soviets relayed a message 
to Nasser that Israeli troops were grouping at the Israeli-Syrian border.  Israeli troops 
were not aligned at the border as Russia stated. Syria was the first country to afford 
the Soviet Union their first major foothold in the Middle East because the Soviets 
wanted to strengthen the regime in Syria.126  Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping and to Israel, this was considered an act of war.  Part of the agreement 
in the previous war was the use of the Strait for Israeli shipping.    
 As previously discussed, differences between the conservative governments 
and radical regimes existed amongst the Arab states.  President Nasser was unsure 
whether or not Israel would attack.127  Despite the conservative regimes’ dislike for 
the radical President Nasser, the moderate Arab states united with Egypt in case of 
war.  They all agreed that Israel needed to be destroyed.  Forces from Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia were stationed on the Sinai Peninsula during the 
war.  This was the first time in their postcolonial histories that the Arab nation was 
united.128   
  Israel launched a preemptive attack. Israel eliminated the Egyptian, Syrian, 
Jordanian and Iraqi air forces in a matter of hours.  Israel tripled in land size by 
gaining the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank 
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from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and reuniting Jerusalem.  When King Hussein of Jordan 
lost the West Bank to Israel, he lost control of almost half the kingdom.  More than 
400 Arab planes were destroyed and over 500 tanks were either captured or 
destroyed.  The three Arab armies lost seventy percent of their heavy equipment.129 
The loss of land and military equipment caused the Arabs to suffer extreme 
humiliation.  The defeat caused President Nasser of Egypt to resign from the 
Presidency, however, due to his popularity among the Arab masses, they did not 
accept it.130  Even with Nasser’s attainment of modern equipment from the Soviets, 
he underestimated Israel. Israel was victorious due to their surprise attack and air 
superiority.131 
Inter-war period 
 Outside interests impeded peacemaking efforts between the Arab states and 
Israel.  On June 19, 1967, the Israeli government voted to return the Golan Heights to 
Syria, the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan in return for peace 
and demilitarization.  All negotiations for peace were prohibited by the Soviet Union.  
After the war, the Russians focused on rebuilding Egypt’s and Syria’s armies.     
Arab countries developed a new policy towards Israel after the war.  In 
September of 1967, leaders of eight Arab countries met. The Arab leaders, including 
King Hassan of Morocco, formed what is known as the Khartoum Resolution.  It 
became known as “the three nos”.   
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No peace with Israel  
No recognition of Israel  
No negotiations with Israel132 
 
In an attempt to reach a peace agreement, the UN adopted Resolution 242 in 
November of 1967.  It called for the “just and lasting peace in the Middle East” that 
included the: 
i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict;  
ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area and their right to live 
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or 
acts of force 133 
 
Disputes over the language of the Resolution caused delays in negotiations.  Both 
sides disagreed as to which should come first, withdrawal from territories or peace. 
Israel adopted a policy that it would not withdraw from the occupied territories until 
negotiations with the Arab states led to a peace agreement that recognized Israel’s 
right to exist and accepted its borders and status.  The Arab states wanted Israel to 
withdraw from the territories first before negotiations could begin.134   
 
 
War of Attrition 1969-1970  
 
The War of Attrition was, in a sense, a continuation of the 1967 war.  It 
consisted of a series of battles along the Suez Canal between Israeli and Egyptian 
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forces.  The War was fought along the borders of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.135  Nasser 
wanted to force a political solution and recover the territory lost in the 1967 war.  He 
sought assistance from the Soviet Union when the battles escalated into air attacks in 
the beginning of 1970.  By mid February that year, Soviet personnel arrived in Egypt.   
Soviet pilots were seen flying in the air over the Canal to achieve a presence in the 
Mediterranean.136  By June 1970, they had succeeded and had Soviet naval fleets and 
infrastructure stationed in the Mediterranean.   
In an effort to prevent further Soviet encroachment in the area, the United 
States took the initiative to call for a cease fire.  Egypt and Israel accepted the cease 
fire agreement effective August 1970.  However, it was later threatened after 
President Nasser moved Soviet missiles closer to the Suez Canal.  President Nasser 
died in September of 1970, and his successor was Anwar el Sadat. 137   
Inter-war period  
Anwar el Sadat’s mission as President was to rid Egypt of the humiliation the 
country suffered as a result of the 1967 war and gain respect internally and externally.  
After his diplomatic attempts failed, he began to plan for war in 1971.138  He trained 
the Egyptian militarily forces for another war.  He expelled the Soviet military 
personnel from the country in 1972; however, he maintained his military connection 
to the Russians.  He created a false sense of security in the country of Israel.  Sadat 
followed the cease fire rules along the Suez Canal, which lowered the Israeli guard. 
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By 1973, the Egyptian military and intelligence services were completely overhauled 
and a plan for the next war was in place.139  
Inter-Arab conflicts were also present during this time.  Jordan became the 
principal base for the PLO after the Six Day War.  The PLO attempted to establish a 
state within a state.  After continuous guerilla activity by the PLO, backed by Syria, 
the two groups attempted the takeover of the Hashemite Monarchy in Jordan.  King 
Hussein expelled the PLO in September of 1970.140  The PLO established a new base 
in Lebanon.   
 
 
Yom Kippur War/War of October - October 6, 1973  
 
 The objective of this war was for Egypt to regain the territory lost in the Six 
Day war.  For several years, it was peaceful along the Suez Canal.  The war began 
when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.  President Sadat had successfully implemented 
a plan of deception against Israel.  In a speech given on October 16, 1973, Sadat 
affirmed his objectives of the war.  The two objectives were, “to restore our territory 
which was occupied in 1967; and to find ways and means to restore and obtain 
respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.”141  The attack surprised 
Israelis’ because it occurred on the Jewish holiday, the Day of Atonement.  It was 
also the holy month of Ramadan for Muslims.  The two superpowers, the United 
States and Soviet Union had previously entered into a détente agreement, or a policy 
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of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.  The détente as 
far as the involvement of superpowers, put the Arab-Israeli conflict temporarily 
aside.142    
 After the war broke out unexpectedly in 1973, the two superpowers policy of 
détente no longer continued.  The two superpowers re-supplied forces again.  The 
United States supplied equipment to Israel and the Soviets supplied arms to Egypt 
and Syria.143  Moroccan forces fought in war against Israel.144  Shortly after the war 
broke out, the UN issued another Security Resolution.  This new Resolution was 
arranged and guided by the United States. 145  It provided a new opportunity for direct 
negotiations with all parties involved.  UN Security Resolution 338 was adopted on 
October 22, 1973, it called for a cease fire and for the implementation of UN 
Resolution 242 from 1967.  UN Resolution 338 also declared that along with the 
cease fire, the parties establish “a just and durable peace in the Middle East.” 146  
From October 23, 1973 and forward, Sadat established a direct relationship with the 
United States.   
 The results of the war were direct discussions between Egypt and Israel.  It 
also resulted in a disengagement plan between Egypt, Syria and Israel. An interim 
agreement on the Sinai Peninsula was signed in 1975.  This agreement eventually led 
to the historical visit to the Israeli Parliament by Sadat.  The Camp David Accords, 
signed by Egypt and Israel with the assistance of the United States, paved the way for 
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the Israeli-Egypt peace treaty.147  This was the first peace treaty between Israel and an 
Arab state.  Two additional factors in this war were that various types of missiles 
were used on a large-scale; and for the first time Arab oil producing countries used oil 
as a weapon.  The oil weapon had major economic impacts on countries throughout 
the entire world.    
Inter-war period 
 
 The late 1970s and 1980s was a critical period as far as conflict in the Middle 
East.  A civil war in Lebanon broke out in 1975 and lasted until 1981.  The Lebanese 
were fighting against the PLO.  In Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was removed 
from power in 1979.  The Shah was considered pro-western and moved to modernize 
the country.148  The new leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini implemented 
an Islamic Republic and renounced western influence in the country.149  The shift was 
clearly towards a fundamentalist government and was referred to as the Iranian 
Revolution.  King Hassan welcomed the Shah into Morocco for temporary exile after 
he was forced to leave Iran in 1979.  His arrival in Morocco was referred to as a 
“strictly private visit.”150 However, the Shah’s welcoming in Morocco demonstrated 
King Hassan’s support for the monarchial system in the Middle East.  
 The late 1970’s were also important because King Hassan arranged talks 
between Arabs and Israelis.  Morocco became a meeting ground for Arab and Israeli 
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government leaders.  The obvious location shows that King Hassan actions were 
valued.  Another conflict broke out in 1980, it was the eight year war between Iran 
and Iraq.  This drew concern to the stability of the Persian Gulf Region.151  On 
October 6, 1981, President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by Muslim 
fundamentalists.152 Sadat’s predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, promised to continue to 
uphold the peace treaty with Israel.  By 1982, the Sinai Peninsula was entirely 
returned to Egypt.153 
 
Operation Peace for Galilee - June 6, 1982  
 Despite significant gains to the peacemaking process, peace between the Arab 
states and Israel did not last long.  The next breakout in conflicts occurred from inter-
Arab quarrels.  PLO units established their headquarters in Lebanon after being 
removed from the country of Jordan.  The PLO took the southern part of the country 
and established a state within a state.154 With the help of Syrians, the PLO units 
launched attacks against Israel inside Lebanese territory.  Israel launched Operation 
Peace for Galilee in 1982.  Operation Peace for Galilee was geared to force the PLO 
units out of Lebanon. The operation was inspired by the fact that PLO units used 
Southern Lebanon as a base for rocket propelled grenade attacks into Israel.  
Operation Peace for Gaililee was successful in getting rid of the PLO from Lebanon.  
After the PLO units were expelled from Lebanon in 1982, they established their 
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central headquarters in Tunisia, but continued to maintain bases throughout several 
Arab countries.155  The defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 did not have the desired 
results in the occupied areas that the Israeli government intended.  Palestinian groups 
did not stop the resistance, instead outbreaks were renewed. 
 
 
Intifada - December 9, 1987 
 
 The intifada (shaking off) resulted from the Palestinian’s dissatisfaction with 
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip. The organizing forces for the 
uprising were civilians, not the PLO.  Incidents of violence between Palestinians and 
Israelis occurred more frequently.  The PLO had not accomplished anything either 
militarily or diplomatically for Palestinian self-determination.  Resistance was 
unorganized, but when a traffic accident occurred on December 9, 1987, it caused a 
full-fledged uprising.  The traffic accident killed four Arabs and injured seven 
others.156  The Palestinians blamed Israel for the accident.  Demonstrations occurred 
at the funerals of the dead and unrest spread throughout the occupied territories.  
Palestinians threw stones, spit at and insulted Israeli forces.  In response, Israeli 
forces used water hoses, tear gas and clubs to control the crowds.  Israel fired warning 
shots into the crowd and then demonstrators were shot at.157   
The uprising brought international attention to the area. The Israeli 
government was criticized by their own Jewish population and the United States for 
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their harsh response to the demonstrations.  Their unsympathetic response enabled the 
PLO to initiate political and diplomatic action.158  The PLO denounced terrorism and 
recognized the Israeli state.  The Intifada had many political consequences as well.  
King Hussein of Jordan relinquished his claim to the West Bank and severed all legal 
and administrative links to the territory.159  The declaration of a Palestinian state was 
proclaimed in 1988.  The U.S. government altered its policy of refusing to negotiate 
with the PLO and the first public meeting between the PLO and the United States 
occurred in December of 1988.  This was the beginning of a new round of 
negotiations for a peace settlement in the Middle East. 160 
 
 
The Gulf War – August 2, 1990  
 
Negotiations for peace were delayed with the outbreak of another war in the 
Middle East.  The Gulf War began in August of 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq proclaimed the Kuwaiti state as a province of Iraq.  
The Arab states were divided amongst those who supported President Hussein and 
those who opposed the invasion and the occupation of another Arab League member. 
Palestinians and PLO leaders sympathized with Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.161 
Arab states such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates supported the American led invasion by providing financial 
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contributions or military units.162  Morocco sent troops to Saudi Arabia as a gesture of 
support to the West and Arab allies.163 When Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw 
from Kuwait, the American led coalition launched an attack on Iraq.  Iraq was 
defeated by coalition forces in January 1991.   
For Israel, the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War was advantageous to the country. 
The conflict damaged Iraq militarily, who at the time, was considered one of the most 
powerful Arab opponents to Israel.  Also, the Intifada was almost completely 
stopped.  Israel played a low-key role in the Gulf War at the request of the United 
States and despite Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israeli soil.  The United States and 
Israel renewed talks after the Gulf War.  Prior to the war, relations were strained due 
Israel’s lack of response to the PLO initiatives for peace.164  At the conclusion of the 
war, President George H.W. Bush announced plans for peace in the Middle East.  
President Bush planned to restructure security in the Persian Gulf, reduce arms in the 
region and expand the economic system in the Middle East for new opportunities 
such as peace and stability. 
The end of the Cold War changed the atmosphere in the Middle East.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Arab states could no longer receive military, 
economic or diplomatic aid from Russia.  The Arab regimes that were once opponents 
of Israel were now willing participants for peace after the Cold War. Relations 
between the Soviet Union and the United States were characterized by cooperation in 
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the 1990s rather than competition.165  The United States and Israel both argued that 
the Gulf War did not develop from the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, the war was 
the catalyst for the occurrence of the Madrid Peace Conference.  It was the first 
conference of direct talks between Israel and the Arab states.166   
While progress was achieved throughout the Arab-Israeli disputes from 1948 
to 1991, outstanding issues remain today.  This section outlined eight conflicts that 
involved numerous countries around the world.  Various factors contributed to the 
continuance of the Arab-Israeli dispute.  Crucial to this thesis are the wars in the mid-
20th century, during the reign of King Hassan.  Two of the wars occurred before King 
Hassan assumed leadership in Morocco.  Although he did not moderate in these wars, 
he did act as a liaison between the radical and conservative regimes in the Middle 
East.  The subsequent section traces King Hassan’s relationship with Israel and 
outlines his precise actions for mediating peace between the Arab states and Israel 
illustrating his concern for peace in the region.  He continued to act as an 
intermediary up until his death in 1999.   
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Morocco’s Jewish Population 
 
Muslim-Jewish relations had its roots in Morocco both prior to the French 
protectorate and after Morocco received its sovereignty.  This fact allowed for the 
opening of relations between Morocco and Israel.  Jews have resided in Morocco for 
nearly 2,000 years.167  In Morocco, and other Muslim countries, Jewish-Muslim 
relations were based on the Islamic principle of Ahl-al-Dhimma.  This was a contract 
or covenant between Muslim rulers and the non-Muslim populations.  A dhimmi, is a 
protected person, either Jewish or Christian and were subject to heavy land and poll 
taxes known as jizyah.  Dhimmis had the freedom to worship and experienced a large 
measure of self governance.  However, they could not exercise control over Muslims 
and were subject to discriminatory social regulations.168  The code of the dhimma 
required the Jews to dress differently from Muslims.  The Jews were not allowed to 
build their churches, synagogues or their homes higher than Muslims’ tallest 
buildings.169   
In Morocco, the execution of the dhimma varied by location.  In the bilad al-
siba, (the land of dissidence where the central government was not established), the 
Sultan relied on the tribal communities to protect the Jews.  The tribes were 
committed to the Sultan’s religious authority.170  In the territory known as the bilad 
al-makhzan, (the land where the central government was established), the Jews 
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followed the traditional form of the dhimma.  They received protection from the 
Sultan.171  They were required to pay a tax or tribute to the Muslim sovereign.  In 
return, the sovereign ensured their physical and economic security, as well as their 
religious liberty and political autonomy.172   
Before the French protectorate in Morocco, the Jewish population’s legal, 
political and social status was not at the same standards as Muslims, due to the code 
of the dhimma.  Any incident large or small, change of regime, or epidemic caused an 
uprising against the Jews.  Outbreaks against the Jews were common in North Africa, 
but were passing in nature.173  Chouraqui, a well respected scholar in the area of 
Muslim-Jewish relations in North Africa summarized relations in the following 
statement:    
During most periods of history, the Jews of North Africa were happier than 
those in most parts of Europe, where they were objects of unrelenting hate; 
such extreme sentiments did not exist in the Maghreb.174 
 
Chouraqui goes on to state that the contempt the Jews faced was based on tradition 
and ritual.  The attacks were not based on passion.175  It is safe to assume that both 
positive and negative relations existed amongst the two communities. Schroeter 
explains the Muslim-Jewish relations best; he stated that the relationship between 
Muslims and Jews in Morocco varied as the country went through different periods 
and regional settings.  The two communities were dependent on one another.  While 
the Jewish society was built on reliance, it was also built around tension.  When 
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foreign interference occurred, the differences between the two groups were made 
even more visible.176  
The majority of the Jewish population lived in a walled quarters or mellahs 
throughout the country.  The mellah was a city inside a city, and usually located close 
to the Sultan’s palace.  The Sultan wished to show that the Jews were under his 
protection. Jews were susceptible to violence with the passing of a Sultan.  Revolts 
and feuds by the sons wishing to assume the throne caused periods of instability in 
the country.  With the absence of a stable government, Berber tribes could commit 
crimes against the vulnerable Jewish population.177 The mellahs in Morocco had 
some of the worst living conditions.178  The mellah’s gates and doors were locked at 
night.  There was no room for expansion inside the walled quarters and overcrowding 
occurred.179  Despite poor living conditions inside the mellahs, Jewish relations with 
Moroccans on a personal level were good and the two groups interacted with each 
other for fair commercial transactions.180  The Jews acted as merchant middlemen and 
as peddlers between the people in the country and the town.  Jews held the 
occupations of traders and craftsmen and formed the central commercial network of 
the Maghreb.181   
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When France became a protectorate of Morocco, the Jews welcomed the 
French authorities as liberators from their second class status in Morocco.  The 
French helped Morocco economically by avoiding isolation in the developing world 
and modernizing the country.182  The French protectorate improved living conditions 
for the Jewish population.  Over the next forty years the Jewish community in 
Morocco increased significantly.  At the beginning of the French protectorate in 1912, 
the Jewish population in Morocco was 110,000.  Towards the end of the protectorate, 
the Jewish population increased to 240,000.  This was due to improved sanitary 
conditions in the mellahs and natural birth rates under the protectorate.183  
Despite the improvements of living conditions inside the country, the presence 
of the French in the country completely disrupted the pattern of coexistence that 
existed between Jews and Muslims over the last thousand years.184  On the whole, 
Jews in Morocco enjoyed a greater degree of freedom and toleration than other Jews 
living in Arab states.185  However, this did not stop their migration to the Holy Land 
of Israel.  In fact, Jews migrated from not only Morocco, but from the other countries 
as well.  The emigration of the Jews from Morocco is contributed to three main 
factors.  The first factor was Germany’s occupation of France and the adoption of 
Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws in French Morocco during World War II.  The second 
factor was the creation of the state of Israel.  The third factor was the Jewish 
population’s uncertainty in Morocco after the French protectorate ended and the 
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country received it sovereignty.  The three factors will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs.   
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 and Germany’s occupation of France in 
1940 was one reason for the Jewish people’s desire to leave French Morocco. 186  
North Africa's close proximity to Europe, the large European population in North 
Africa and its colonial status, all contributed to the Jewish population experiencing 
the Vichy's anti-Semitic policies.187  When Germany occupied France, the new Vichy 
government enacted anti-Jewish laws in France that applied to the French 
protectorates.  King Mohammed V opposed the implementation of the Vichy decrees 
issued by the French authorities.  A document discovered in the archives of the 
Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed King Mohammed’s attitude.  A 
telegram titled “Change in Attitude of the Sultan of Morocco Towards the French 
Authorities” to Vichy on May 24, 1941 stated the following.    
We have learned from a reliable source that relations between the 
Sultan of Morocco and the French authorities have been quite tense 
since the day when the Office of the Resident General applied the 
decree concerning the ‘measures against the Jews,’ despite the official 
opposition of the Sultan.  The Sultan refused to distinguish among his 
subjects, saying that all were ‘loyal.’188  
 
King Mohammed was quoted in the same telegram stating to his Jewish subjects in 
the presence of French officials that,   
I in no way approve of the anti-Semitic laws and I refuse to be 
associated with any measure of which I disapprove.  I wish to inform 
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you that, as in the past, the Jews remain under my protection and I 
refuse to allow any distinction to be made among my subjects.189 
 
The Vichy laws were the harshest during the period of July 1940 to November 8, 
1941 when the allied forces landed in North Africa.190  Despite the efforts of King 
Mohammed to protect his Jewish population, it was not enough and the anti-Semitic 
laws caused many Jews to leave the country voluntarily.    
The second factor for Jewish migration was the creation of the state of Israel.  
In 1950, Israel’s government passed legislation, known as the “the Law of Return”.  
This new law stated that “every Jew has the right to immigrate to this country.”191  
The Jewish population’s desire to return to the “promised land” had a significant 
impact on Jews leaving Morocco.  The Central Bureau of Statistics of the State and 
Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency recorded that from 1948 to 1956 
175,000 Jews from the Maghreb migrated to Israel.  110,000 of those Jews were from 
Morocco.192    
The third factor that caused the Jewish population to migrate was the end of 
the French protectorate in Morocco in 1956.  Morocco’s independence caused 
uncertainty to the Jewish population located in French Morocco.  At the time of 
Morocco's Independence, the Jewish community numbered 275,000.  This was the 
largest Jewish population in any Arab country at that time.  Jewish nationalism and 
uncertainty during the transition from the protectorate to independence were some 
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reasons for migration.  Political conditions caused fluctuations to the freedom of 
movement to Israel. The frequent change caused anxiety in the Jewish population.  
When periods of free movement ended, clandestine operations began.193   
 
 
Motivations to an Alliance  
 
Morocco and Israel had reciprocal interests when relations began in the mid 
1950s.  The alliance between the two countries enabled King Hassan to arbitrate more 
effectively during the latter part of the Arab-Israeli wars.  Morocco and Israel were in 
the beginning phases of establishing relations when the Arab-Israeli wars occurred in 
1948, 1956 and 1967.  Mediation between the two countries did not occur during 
those wars.  Israel and Morocco both had motivations when they sought contact with 
one another.  Morocco and Israel both needed mutual assistance as new states.  
Morocco sought support from Israel in order to gain Independence.  However, Israel 
did not want to jeopardize relations with France so they were unable to assist the 
Moroccans.  Israel wanted Morocco to have a lenient policy towards Jewish 
emigration out of the country.  After King Hassan ascended to the throne, he sought 
assistance from Israel in the intelligence and military fields.194   
The second common interest the two countries shared was the need to develop 
diplomatic and economic connections with other parts of the world.  Israel maintained 
economic relations with South Africa and the states considered Black Africa. In an 
effort to avoid isolation in the developing world, Israel also contacted countries that 
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were newly independent.195  In the Maghreb, Israel contacted Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia.  The third commonality was their desire to prevent radical regimes spreading 
throughout the Arab world. The Israeli government feared that Egypt would sabotage 
Israeli economic and social involvement in Africa.  Israel also wanted to distance the 
Maghreb from the Arab League.  Morocco, a conservative country, did not want the 
Middle East to be dominated by Egypt’s radical ideology.196  King Hassan also found 
it necessary to prevent the spread of radical movements inside the country, such as 
the one led by opposition leader, Mehdi Ben Barka.   
 
Mediation Efforts by King Hassan and the Benefits to Morocco  
During the first three Arab-Israeli wars, Moroccan-Israeli relations revolved 
around mass Jewish emigration from Morocco to Israel and the trading of 
intelligence.  After the 1973 war, relations were improved when King Hassan took an 
active role in mediating conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. King Hassan played 
an important role in mediating conflict in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  Two 
significant events characterized King Hassan as a conservative leader among the 
radical regimes and as a mediator for the Arab states, Israel and the United States.  
The first action was King Hassan’s role as a host during the many Arab and Islamic 
summit meetings.  The second was his role as a mediator during the latter part of the 
Arab-Israeli conflicts.  To improve relations inside Morocco, King Hassan appointed 
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a Jewish leader to his government.  This helped to improve relations with Jews inside 
the country.  A tourism industry developed as Jews began traveling to Morocco.  
King Hassan also met secretly and directly with government leaders from Israel and 
took the risk of harming relations with regimes in the Arab states.  All of these 
actions combined show that King Hassan was driven to improve conditions inside 
Morocco and to establish peace in the Middle East.   
   King Hassan played a large role in building relations between Morocco and 
Israel and also facilitating peace between the Arab States and Israel.  The following 
section assesses Moroccan-Israeli relations from the beginning of relations in the 
1950s through King Hassan’s death in 1999.  Discussions between Morocco and 
Israel began when the large Jewish population in Morocco wanted to migrate to 
Israel.  In the mid 1950s leaders in Morocco opposed Jewish migration to Israel on 
the grounds that the migrants were joining the Israeli Defense Forces and fighting 
Arab countries.  The Moroccan government also feared economic repercussions.197 
Israelis initially wanted Morocco to offer a lenient policy towards Jewish emigration 
from Morocco.  Israel feared French reaction to relations with Morocco, however 
Israel also wanted to assist the Jewish communities in the Maghreb.  In the 1950’s 
Israel tried to avoid isolation in the Third World.  Israel also attempted to distance the 
Maghreb from the Arab League and from Egypt.  In Morocco, Israel contacted 
government officials, groups opposed to the monarchy, palace employees and 
security-intelligence officers.  Israel even went as far as to contact Moroccan officials 
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by way of journalists, intellectuals, and representatives of Jewish organizations. Israel 
and opposition leader, Mehdi Ben Barka established relations for a short time.  Ben 
Barka promised support for Moroccan Jews to immigrate to Israel in return for 
Israel’s support of his opposition group, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires 
(National Union of Popular Forces or UNFP).  Ben Barka also asked for western 
organizations to support his “popular forces,” by giving financial assistance and 
obtaining weapons for them.198   
When the French authorities in Morocco halted legal mass emigration in 1956, 
an underground movement ensued.199  Morocco became a member of the Arab 
League in 1958 and migration was even more difficult.200  The Mossad, Israel’s 
intelligence agency arranged a secret campaign of migration, called Operation Yakhin 
in 1960.201  The Operation was the secret emigration of Moroccan Jews to Israel.  
Tens of thousands of Jews migrated covertly from Morocco to Israel.  Not all Jews 
went to Israel, they settled in France, Canada and the United States.202  The 
underground movement made international attention on January 10, 1961 when a 
small boat, named the Pisces, carrying forty-four Jews, sank on the northern coast of 
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Morocco as they attempted to leave the country. 203 King Mohammed reversed the 
French policy prohibiting migration shortly before his death in February of 1961.204  
The ties in the late 1950s and early 1960s allowed additional exchanges of 
information between the two countries.  Early Moroccan-Israeli contacts in the 1960s 
revolved around the exchange of intelligence and defense strategies.  In 1963, Israeli 
security forces trained the Moroccan forces.  King Hassan had a permanent 
delegation of the Mossad in Morocco.  The office was in place so that the Mossad, 
Israeli leaders, King Hassan and his senior officials could meet. Morocco was one of 
the first Arab countries to establish ties with Israel; however, they did not consider 
the ties “diplomatic relations”.  It was during the decolonization period and mostly in 
the decade after the war in 1967 that contacts became more frequent. 205    
Morocco was the host of several Islamic and Arab summit meetings. King 
Hassan consistently acted as a moderator between the radical and conservative 
regimes in the Middle East during these summits.  Arab summit conferences were 
designed to handle disputes between inter-Arab states which regular meetings could 
not overcome.  Arab summit meetings were held in Morocco in 1965, 1969, 1974, 
1981, 1982 and 1985. 206 King Hassan also hosted the first Islamic summit meeting in 
1969 and continuing summits in 1984 and 1994.207  The two conferences in 1969 
allowed the United States to recognize King Hassan as a moderate in the Arab world 
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and showed that he could be of help to Israel.  The first one was the Islamic summit 
in September of 1969 and the second was the Arab summit in December of 1969.   
 King Hassan was one of the original promoters of the Islamic summit 
meetings. In fact, the Organisation of Islamic Summit (OIC) was established at the 
September 1969 meeting in Rabat, Morocco.  Twenty five Muslim nations were 
present at the summit.  King Hassan’s convening of the Islamic summit was seen as a 
major achievement by the United States.  
We agree that bringing together government leaders (including 9 heads 
of state) representing about 300 million Moslems was a major 
achievement. It took considerable skill on the part of Hassan and co-
initiator King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to gain rapid agreement for early 
scheduling of a summit and to persuade suspicious non-Arab Moslems 
to participate in an Arab-dominated assembly. Less than a week before 
opening day, President Nasser launched a counteroffensive seeking to 
postpone the summit indefinitely. In the end, his bluff was called and a 
UAR delegation was dispatched to Rabat. Only Iraq and Syria of the 
"progressive" Arab group failed to appear. A final crisis occurred in 
mid-summit, when a belated invitation to India provoked a stormy 
Pakistani response and India's ouster. Even this turbulent event, which 
might have broken up any other conference, only prolonged the 
meeting an extra day.208 
 
The conference declared for Palestine the “full support to the Palestinian people for 
the restitution of their rights" and in their "struggle for national liberation."209  It 
called for the reinstatement of Jerusalem's pre-June 1967 status and the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from all occupied territories from the 1967 war.  Additionally, the 
conference requested that the countries of France, United Kingdom, United States and 
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Soviet Union secure compliance with the 1967 Security Council resolution, which 
called for a peace settlement and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied 
territories.   
Despite demonstrating full support for the Palestinian people, divisions 
amongst the conservative and radical Arab regimes were present during the summit.  
King Hassan criticized Arab extremist groups in a news conference after the summit 
concluded.  He stated that he supported the anti-Israeli groups “who fight at the front 
openly, who fight at the United Nations, who fight to convince states of their cause 
and their right (sic).”210  He also stated that the radical elements did not serve “the 
Palestinian cause, the Arab cause or the Moslem cause.”211 King Hassan met with 
American government leaders shortly after the conclusion of the summit.  In a 
memorandum of conversation, King Hassan outlined his motivations to American 
government leaders,       
Morocco, said Mr. Tahiri, has set its path and is on its way to the 
difficult goal of bringing a good life to its people. It is also seeking to 
make its contribution to peace in the Middle East as well as in the 
Mediterranean area.  The King brought together the leaders of the 
Moslem world in a constructive fashion at the Islamic Conference. 
Morocco can in the future play a significant role. The King wished by 
his mission to show that his only concern was a constructive 
relationship with the United States and the internal strength of 
Morocco. Military strength was not a problem. The primary problem 
was economic.212  
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King Hassan acknowledged that Morocco was experiencing economic problems.  
However, the creation of the OIC was an avenue to strengthen relations with other 
Muslim countries and to improve conditions in Morocco.  
In December of 1969, King Hassan hosted the Fifth Arab Summit Conference 
in Rabat.  The meeting was planned for the Arab countries to coordinate their military 
forces and economic resources against Israel.213 President Nasser of Egypt declared in 
the summit that a full scale war against Israel was inevitable.  The conference ended 
early due to the Arab countries’ failure to come to a common consensus.  The UAR 
asked for large amounts of financial aid for military purposes.  Morocco, as well as 
the countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, and Tunisia refused to contribute 
financial aid to fund the war.214 
King Hassan met with the U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, in 
February of 1970.  In this conversation, King Hassan revealed he was willing to meet 
with the Israelis and offered his perspective on making peace.  In a memorandum to 
the State Department, Rogers, reported King Hassan’s thoughts on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.    
The King said he did not expect those who made war to make peace.  
He placed hopes on young generation Israelis and was ready to meet 
with some Israelis his age for whom this is not a war of religion.  King 
had no faith in implementation UN Resolution Nov 1967 and felt US 
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and Sovs present spirit rapprochement should try to eliminate this one 
focus possible conflict (sic). 215 
 
King Hassan met with the President of the World Jewish Congress, Dr. Nahum 
Goldmann in June of 1970 shortly after his meeting with Secretary of State, Rogers.  
In a press interview Dr. Goldmann confirmed that King Hassan contacted him via a 
mutual friend and the two spoke about Dr. Goldmann’s idea of a peace settlement at 
the King’s palace.  Before his meeting with King Hassan, Dr. Goldmann asked the 
Israeli Cabinet to approve a meeting between him and President Nasser of Egypt, but 
the meeting was not approved.  Morocco was not considered at war with Israel, so 
approval by the government was not needed.216    
A summit the following year did nothing to improve relations with Israel.  
However, the meeting was symbolic to the Arab states and Palestinians.  In October 
of 1974 at an Arab summit held in Rabat, Morocco, the Arab heads of state 
unanimously recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people"217  The Israeli government rejected the conclusions of the summit.  
The Prime Minister of Israel, Rabin, declared that the government of Israel would 
“not negotiate with terrorist organizations whose avowed policy is to strive for 
Israel's destruction and whose method is terrorist violence.”218  This showed that 
while it was important to negotiate with the Israeli government, King Hassan  
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continued supporting the Palestinian movement.  While this move could have 
jeopardized relations with the United States and Israel, King Hassan did not abandon 
his goal of bringing peace in the Middle East nor his moderate approach.     
King Hassan managed mediation efforts with Israel and the Arab states in the 
mid-1970s.  In addition, he was making internal efforts for peace.   The issue over the 
Western Sahara prolonged conflict between states in the Maghreb.  King Hassan’s 
goal to find peace both in and out of his country is evident in his peaceful 
demonstration to his claim on the Western Sahara.  The plan was known as the Green 
March.   It was the display of 350,000 unarmed Moroccans marching south to the 
Sahara as an act of reasserting the sovereignty of the Sahara which was held by the 
Spanish at that time.219 King Hassan noted that,  
Truly, everyone was armed:  they brandished banners proclaiming 
Moroccan sovereignty, green flags and our national flag with its green 
star. Many also carried the Book.  These arms were, to their way of 
thinking, more redoubtable than the most powerful and highly trained 
armoured divisions.220  
 
The Green March in 1975 eventually became one of the most significant events of his 
reign and demonstrates that King Hassan genuinely wanted peace in Morocco and 
with neighboring Algeria.  According to the King, the March illustrated Morocco’s 
new obligations to its people. Over time he helped to improve the economic situation 
in the Western Sahara by building ports, railways, roads, factories, schools and 
hospitals.221   
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An additional domestic achievement by King Hassan was his improvement in 
relations with the Jewish community both inside Morocco and in Israel.  In the mid 
1970s, only 22,000 Jews resided in Morocco.  A counselor to the King, Ahmed Reda 
Guedira, said that “King Hassan is determined to make Morocco a model of real 
Arab-Jewish co-existence.”222  King Hassan’s efforts allowed conditions in the 
country to change. The Jews that were once separated in the mellahs, were allowed to 
live amongst Muslims.  King Hassan made efforts to invite Moroccan Jews in Israel 
to return to the country.  The Moroccan government offered these returnees financial 
assistance with lodging and help locating jobs.  In addition to relocating back to 
Morocco, Jews also began vacationing in the country.  The visitors increased the 
tourism industry and became an important link to Morocco’s economy.223   
To show the importance of Arab-Israeli peace in the Middle East, King 
Hassan of Morocco played a role in the Egypt-Israeli peace talks in the late 1970s.  In 
October 1976, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel arrived in Morocco disguised 
with a wig.224  Direct Moroccan-Israeli contacts had not been made public at the time.  
In June of 1977, upon Israel’s request, King Hassan arranged a meeting between 
General Hofi, of Israel’s Mossad and General Kamal Hassan Ali, Egypt’s Director of 
Military Intelligence.225 These advance talks led to President Sadat’s famous 
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November 1977 speech to the Egyptian National Assembly.  Sadat informed the 
nation that he was willing to discuss peace directly with Israel.226  Had it not been for 
the advance preparations in Morocco, the peace treaties may not have occurred.  King 
Hassan’s intermediary role between Egypt and Israel led to the signing of the Camp 
David Accords.  This agreement returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.  The Accords 
at Camp David led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979.  The treaty was the first 
agreement signed between Israel and Egypt.  It was based on the withdrawal and 
demilitarization of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula.  In return, Egypt offered to fully 
recognize Israel.  
In spite of contacts with Israel in the late 1970s, a settlement plan could not be 
completely agreed upon between the Arabs and Israelis.  Relations between Morocco 
and Israel became public regardless of disagreements between the Arab states and 
Israel.  In spite of efforts from the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab 
states, negotiations of a settlement plan were not concluded in the early 1980s.  After 
the 1982 war in Lebanon (known as Operation Peace for Galilee), President Reagan 
called for a peace plan in September 1982.  The plan stated that it did not support the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, 
but it opposed permanent control or annexation of the territories by Israel.  The plan 
called for a “self government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in 
association with Jordan.”227  The United States also advised the Israeli government to 
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cease settlement activity in the area, but did not request the area to be dismantled. 228  
Both the Israelis and Palestinians rejected the plan.  
King Hassan held an Arab summit meeting in Fez, Morocco within the month 
of President Reagan’s plan.  The provisions of the plan called for Israel to withdraw 
from all territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, and for the removal of 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.  The Fez peace plan also called for a 
Palestinian state with PLO leadership.  It was based on UN Security Resolution 242 
and recognized the existence of the state of Israel.229 The Soviet Union announced 
their peace plan, the Brezhnev, very similar to the Fez plan, but with provisions on 
Israeli security.  However, both plans were rejected by the Israelis.230      
Throughout the 1980s, King Hassan continued to deal with issues in the 
Western Sahara; however, he was determined to put an end to conflict and renew 
relations with other countries of the Maghreb.  On the tenth Anniversary of the Green 
March, in 1985, the king addressed the Nation, stating,   
Because of Morocco’s eagerness to preserve Africa’s present and 
future, and in response to the wishes expressed to me by some African, 
Arab and European Heads of States – friends of Morocco -, I have on 
behalf of my country, taken a decisive step forward, with a view to 
putting an end to the tension in Northwest Africa, proving thus 
Morocco’s willingness and firm determination to see peace and 
security reinstalled in the region.  I am referring to the initiative.231 
 
The initiative was a peace plan sponsored by the United Nations.  It called for a 
ceasefire and the creation of a referendum in order to decide the territory’s future 
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standing.  In 1988, after 12 years of strained relations, Morocco and Algeria renewed 
diplomatic activities.  While the conflict in the Western Sahara has yet to be solved, 
renewing relations with Algeria was a step towards finding a “just and lasting 
solution” to the stalemate.232 
King Hassan also established relations with Libya during the 1980s.  Libya 
had previously been considered a long-time enemy of Morocco.  Libyan and 
Moroccan leaders had a history of supporting each other’s opponents.  Their alliance 
was not approved by the United States, however Morocco’s new relationship with 
Libya allowed for economic benefits in Morocco which would benefit local citizens.  
King Hassan’s actions demonstrate that economic benefits were a primary concern of 
his country.  Morocco received a loan of 100 million dollars from Libya in 1985.  
Libya received assistance from Moroccan medical personnel and pharmaceuticals.  
The union with Libya also allowed Morocco to purchase Libyan oil at discounted 
prices.233  The alliance demonstrated that King Hassan acted on what was best for 
Morocco domestically despite disapproval from the West.       
In addition to renewed relations with Algeria and Libya, an important 
breakthrough in Moroccan-Israeli relations occurred.  A public visit from an Israeli 
official occurred for the first time in Morocco.  In mid-1986, Shimon Peres, the 
Israeli Prime Minister, traveled to Morocco; it was the first open visit from an Israeli 
official.  Shimon Peres and President Reagan both suggested that the meeting occur in 
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the United States.  King Hassan rejected the offer because he wanted the meeting to 
be free of super power influence.234 King Hassan became the second leader after 
President Sadat to establish open relations with Israel. 235  
During their discussions, Shimon Peres would not recognize the PLO and did 
not plan to withdraw from the occupied territories.  King Hassan made it clear to 
Peres that any peace negotiation would have to include the evacuation of the occupied 
territories and the recognition of the PLO.  The meeting was concluded without 
specific results.  It was a significant event because it was the first time that an Arab 
leader and an Israeli official met without a mediator.236 Other Arab countries were not 
pleased with the occurrence of the meeting.  Syria severed ties with Morocco. The 
reception in Israel was more positive.  The President of Israel, responded, 
But I believe that perhaps more than anything else, the Prime 
Minister's actual trip under such circumstances - openly - to Morocco, 
proves that we have truly passed an important watershed in the Middle 
East.  This trip perhaps proves, more than anything else, the 
tremendous progress that has been made - perhaps more in the region's 
subconsciousness, but now also in its consciousness.237 
 
Besides showing his dedication to improving relations with Israel, King Hassan also 
spoke on behalf of Palestinians.  He considered mediation between the Arabs and 
Israelis more productive if it came from inside the region, not by the outsiders (such 
as the Americans).  In an address to the nation on July 23 1986, King Hassan declared 
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the following, “I, your servant and your king, have assumed the leading role in the 
proclamation of the PLO as the valid interlocutor and the sole, legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians”.238  The visit from Israeli’s Prime Minister was a 
step towards resolving the barrier that had existed for many years.  American and 
Israeli leaders refused to enter into negotiations with PLO.  Later that year, the 
Palestinian uprising, known as the Intifada went into full force.  The uprising forced 
Arabs and Israelis to reconsider their approaches to a peace settlement.   
 The decade of the 1990s was a defining period for the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the superpower rivalry. For the United States, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
was a symbolic ending to the Cold War.  The Soviet Union could no longer arm the 
radical Arab regimes.  Negotiations for peace were renewed when PLO denounced 
terrorism, recognized the existence of Israel and accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 
338.  A relationship between the United States and the PLO was established.  Israel 
was urged by the United States to negotiate directly with the PLO.239  The Gulf War 
in 1990 temporarily halted negotiations for peace.  The United States and Israel both 
argued that the Gulf War was of no relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, the 
war was the catalyst for the occurrence of the Madrid Peace Conference.240 
 The Madrid Peace Conference, convened in 1991 at Madrid, Spain after the 
Gulf War.  It was the first conference of direct talks between Israel and the Arab 
states.  The conference was two-fold, bilateral and multilateral talks occurred.  The 
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bilateral talks were planned to resolve conflicts in the past and the negotiations were 
geared at achieving peace with the Palestinians and with the countries of Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon.  Multilateral negotiations were aimed at building the future 
Middle East. The negotiations were geared towards issues that affected the entire 
Middle East such as economic development, environmental issues, arms control and 
the refugee population.  Working groups met at different locations over various 
periods of time.  Morocco was a participant in the multilateral negotiations.241   
  In September of 1993, an agreement was signed by the PLO leader, Yasser 
Arafat and the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin.  They signed a Declaration of 
Principles that eventually extended limited autonomy to Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  The Declaration of Principles was also referred to as the Oslo 
Accords because they were finalized in Oslo, Norway after a series of secret talks. 
The agreements were a framework for future relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  The Accords established the creation of a Palestinian authority and 
called for the withdrawal of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  Israel and the PLO 
formally recognized each other’s right to exist. 242  Additionally, Israel made progress 
in establishing formal relations with Morocco.   
In 1994, Morocco and Israel agreed to official diplomatic relations.  The 
opening of offices in Morocco and Israel was an important development in the 
relationship between the two countries.  Liaison offices were opened in Rabat and Tel 
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Aviv.  King Hassan opened the offices despite hesitation from Moroccan cabinet 
members.243 By this time, Moroccan Jews played important political roles in 
Morocco’s cities.244  This showed King Hassan’s dedication to solving the conflict in 
Israel and establishing better relations with Jews inside the country.   
An even more important milestone occurred in late 1994, the convening of the 
first Middle East-North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca, and the Seventh 
Islamic Summit in Rabat, hosted by King Hassan. In the Middle-East North Africa 
Economic Summit, King Hassan brought together Arabs and Israelis to discuss the 
partnerships of businesses and governments in the Middle East, in addition to the 
issue of comprehensive peace.245  This conference occurred as a result of the bilateral 
talks at the Madrid Peace Conference.  The following year, the second Middle East-
North Africa Economic Summit convened in Jordan.  It was the largest economic 
summit ever gathered.  Sixty countries participated in the three day conference.246   
The Seventh Islamic Summit held in December of 1994 was another event 
demonstrating King Hassan’s role as a moderator among the Arab states.  Islamic 
countries convened at the summit in order to “strengthen solidarity between the 
Member States.”  King Hassan called on the larger Muslim community to help with 
the Arab nation to “…settle its differences, close ranks, unify positions and rise above 
the causes of contention among brothers.” King Hassan was unanimously elected as 
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the Chairman.247  This was a position that he would later use to assist the United 
States in achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis.     
In addition to economic summits, the mid-1990s brought several noteworthy 
arrangements between Israel and the Arab states.  First, Israel relinquished control of 
the Gaza Strip and Jericho.  Second, King Hussein of Jordan and Israel signed a peace 
agreement which ended the state of war between the two countries.  Next, Israel and 
the Palestinians signed an empowerment agreement for the West Bank.  Israel turned 
over administrative power to the Palestinians in several areas with additional areas to 
follow in the future.  A second phase of the agreement was signed in 1995 that 
pertained to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The Oslo II or Taba Accords (signed in 
Taba, Egypt) expanded Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza and called for 
elections of a Palestinian council and the release of Palestinian prisoners.248    
When bilateral talks were at a standstill, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, 
met with King Hassan in 1995.  Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO, also attended the 
meeting in Morocco.  The point of the meeting was to repair peace talks between the 
Arab states and Israel.   
 At the conclusion of the meeting, King Hassan’s role as mediator was 
acknowledged by Israeli and Palestinian leaders. They issued the following statement,   
The Israelis and the Palestinians, recognizing the important role of His 
Majesty King Hassan II in the peace process in general and the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations in particular, considered it appropriate, at this 
stage of the process, for Mr. Yasser Arafat and Mr. Shimon Peres to 
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consult with H.M. the King of Morocco. A meeting was held under his 
patronage to seek ways to bolster and accelerate the peace process 
with the aim of implementing as rapidly as possible the obligations 
contained in the Oslo, Washington and Cairo agreements. 
Mr. Shimon Peres and Mr. Yasser Arafat wish to thank His Majesty 
King Hassan II for the opportunity to meet with him in Morocco, for 
his warm and cordial hospitality, and for his untiring efforts 
throughout the years in the cause of peace.249 
 
This meeting showed that Israel valued the continuing efforts for peace by King 
Hassan.  The meeting also demonstrated Israel’s recognition that mediation efforts 
must come from within the region and not by outside groups.     
As part of the continuing Oslo peace accords, the Israeli government arranged 
the turnover of land to Palestinians over a period of time.  During the process, the 
Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated in 1995 by a Jewish 
extremist.  Rabin was the first Israeli leader to recognize the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinians and to negotiate with the PLO.  World leaders 
gathered at his funeral, including representatives from Morocco.  It was an indication 
that Rabin had changed the Middle East.   King Hassan was not present at the funeral 
because of an illness; however, the Prime Minister of Morocco attended on his 
behalf.250  King Hassan offered genuine regards about Rabin to an Israeli newspaper.  
King Hassan considered Prime Minister Rabin, a friend, "a pillar of the Middle East 
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peace process and a great leader."251  Shimon Peres, Rabin’s successor was forced to 
temporarily discontinue peace negotiations after terrorist activities by Islamist groups.  
In March 1996, King Hassan as well as many other world leaders attended the 
“Summit of the Peacemakers” in Egypt.  The summit was sponsored jointly by the 
United States and Egypt and was geared to salvaging the peace accords.  Twenty-nine 
countries were represented, including Israel.  The summit was a symbol to the world 
that attacks on Israel were not condoned.  It was also a show of public support for 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli leader Shimon Peres.252   This summit 
demonstrated a growing public recognition of Israel by other Arab states and can be 
attributed to King Hassan’s efforts as a peacemaker.   
King Hassan was equally committed to improving conditions in Morocco.  He 
reaffirmed his determination for domestic peace in November of 1996.   He met 
directly with Polisario leaders, the group seeking independence in the Western 
Sahara.  The king confirmed his dedication to the peace plan sponsored by the United 
Nations and to improving conditions in the region.  In a speech to the nation on the 
21st anniversary of the Green March, he stated the following,  
…and we have given them [Western Sahara] priority in the sphere of 
economic, social and cultural development. Thanks be to God, our 
efforts and sacrifices have borne fruit. Now, one can see over there big 
cities and huge developments. One can also see residents and youths 
whose eyes are glowing with enthusiasm and nationalism as well as 
readiness to meet, like in the past, internal or external challenges 
facing their country in the same way as their brethren in the north.  
Dear people: This is what I wanted to tell you on the occasion of [the 
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anniversary of] the Green March. I wanted to tell you that our march 
has always been a march for development, for progress, for unity and 
for forgiveness for everybody. It has also been a march for the 
future.253 
 
This shows King Hassan’s perseverance in solving the dispute in the Western Sahara 
and to economic growth in the territory.    
 As for the Arab-Israeli peace process, riots and violence continued to disrupt 
development throughout the mid-to-late 1990s.  However, in January of 1997, 
relations between the Arab states and Israel were renewed with the signing of the 
Hebron Agreement by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO leader Yasser 
Arafat.  The Hebron Agreement was a provision of the Oslo Accords and called for 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from 80 percent of Hebron.  Hebron was the only 
remaining city under Israeli occupation in the West Bank.  The United States actively 
participated in the peace process.  Dennis Ross, the chief Middle East peace 
negotiator in the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, facilitated the 
signing of the Hebron Agreement.  Dennis Ross met with King Hassan and urged him 
to “use his influence both on Arafat (to act on security) and on the OIC (to avoid 
inflammatory anti-Israel resolutions)”.254     
 The agreement was a step forward in the peace process.  The Hebron 
agreement enabled Israel and Morocco to restore relations with Morocco.   Following 
the signing of the Hebron Agreement, King Hassan was one of a few Arab leaders to 
personally recognize Israel’s efforts for continued peace.  He sent a letter of 
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congratulations to Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel.   It was King Hassan’s first 
direct contact with the new Prime Minister.255 Soon after, the two leaders discussed 
the possibility of opening of direct flights between Israel and Morocco.256   
 The peace process constantly varied in the late 1990s.   The talks resumed in 
October of 1998 with the signing of the Wye River Memorandum.  It was an interim 
agreement that called for further Israeli withdrawal of the West Bank, release of 
Palestinian prisoners and ratification of the PLO’s Charter that contained references 
to the destruction of Israel.  However, domestic issues in Israel temporarily halted 
peace talks.  The Israeli government was dissolved in December of 1998, and new 
elections were called.  In a speech before the Israeli elections, King Hassan 
encouraged Jews of Moroccan origin to vote for peace. 257  The next Prime Minister, 
Ehud Barak was elected in May, 1999. He was committed to full peace based on UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.258  King Hassan died shortly after the 
swearing in of the new Prime Minister of Israel.      
The Monarch’s funeral on July 25, 1999, provided a final meeting place for 
world leaders.  World leaders such as President Chirac of France, American President 
Clinton and Charles, Prince of Wales attended the ceremony in Morocco as a 
demonstration of western support.  Also in attendance were Israeli leaders such as the 
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former Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, and the newly elected Prime Minister, Ehud 
Barak. 259  King Hassan’s funeral played a role in bringing together Arabs and 
Israelis.  The occasion enabled the United States to promote a “spirit of peace" after 
Israel’s recent election of Prime Minister Barak.  The Arab delegations were eager to 
speak to the Israelis during the funeral.  Prime Minister Barak met with the President 
of Algeria and spoke in front of Israeli television.  This was a momentous occasion 
due to Algeria’s past anti-Israel stance.260   
The conflict is constantly changing as events and people alter its course; 
however, relations between Israel and the Palestinians continue today.  Negotiations 
between the Arab states and Israel have improved over the past 40 years and can be 
contributed to the mediation efforts of King Hassan.  Decades ago, Israel and the 
United States refused to talk with the PLO.  Today, leaders from Israel and the United 
States negotiate directly with Palestinian representatives. Israel and the PLO 
recognize each other’s right to exist.  The PLO Charter calling for Israel’s destruction 
was amended.  King Hassan met with Israeli leaders when no other Arab government 
leaders would.  He was an ally of the West and maintained relations with the United 
States and Israel.  King Hassan offset the potential consequences of these 
relationships by playing an active role in Arab summits and Islamic conferences.  The 
king maintained a moderate balance amongst the radical and conservative regimes in 
the Middle East.  Under King Hassan’s reign, Morocco became a meeting place for 
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secret and public gatherings with Israeli and American leaders, in addition to 
numerous Arab delegations.       
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“Everyone knows that Morocco is a nation with only one desire: to work in peace 
with all people, be they from the north, south, east or west.”   
 
“Those who believe in the Book – as we do – know that peace is preferable to war, 
fraternity to hatred, harmony to discord, construction to ruin, and smiles to tears.” 
 
“To serve the cause of peace! A king can have no greater ambition.”   
 
“The duty of a sovereign is to keep his nation on this road, reigning over the heart and 
spirit of his people, as they reign over his.  I know the Moroccan people, for I descend 
directly from them.”  
 
“My wish for the Moroccan people is that they should live in peace, and be granted 
the social justice which they so ardently desire.  This is the end to which we are all 
striving.  I am sure that with the help of Him on whom we all depend, we shall be 
victorious.” 
- His Majesty King Hassan II (1929 – 1999)  
 
 
 
Sources: 
 “King Hassan II”. Picture. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/ 
Hassan.html (accessed July 8, 2007). 
 
Quotes - King Hassan II, The Challenge: The Memoirs of King Hassan II of Morocco, 
(London: Macmillan London Limited, 1978)  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the early years of his reign, King Hassan faced a number of threats to the 
Moroccan throne.   A powerful force of nationalism in Morocco developed during the 
French Protectorate.  With the backing of the nationalist groups, King Mohammed 
and Crown Prince Hassan achieved independence from France.  The nationalists 
eventually developed into opposition groups that demanded political change.  The 
groups were the basis for political and civil unrest in the government subsequent to 
King Hassan assuming power.  There were five constitutions in Morocco during King 
Hassan’s reign. The various constitutions show the difficulty King Hassan faced in 
maintaining power in Morocco. 261 As a method to protect his monarchy, King Hassan 
utilized the Moroccan armed forces, but high ranking military officers eventually 
betrayed him.  He later realized that his initial method of maintaining power, focusing 
primarily on the armed forces, was an oversight.   
In addition to domestic challenges, regional factors also had the potential to 
destabilize the monarchy.  The conflict in the Western Sahara coupled with Algeria’s 
support for the Western Sahara’s independence caused an imbalance of power in the 
region and was another factor weakening King Hassan’s throne.  To offset the threat, 
King Hassan used the conflict to regain domestic allies.  The king and the political 
parties agreed that the acquisition of the Western Sahara was imperative to Morocco’s 
integrity.  Lastly, the exportation of President Nasser’s radical and socialist 
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viewpoints in the Arab world caused concern for the monarchy.  He divided radical 
and conservative regimes in the Middle East.     
 To counteract the threats to the monarchy, King Hassan formed alliances with 
countries beyond the Maghrebi states.  He entered into economic and military 
arrangements with France, Israel, the United States and Soviet Union.  He balanced 
relations with western countries by taking an equally active role in radical Arab 
regimes.  The king used his spiritual authority to guide adversaries.  His moderate 
approach in the numerous summits he hosted in Morocco gave him stature as a 
mediator between conservative and radical Arab regimes.  In spite of the risks of 
being isolated by Arab regimes, the benefits were far greater. King Hassan carefully 
assessed the risks associated with dealing with the United States, Soviet Union, Israel 
and other Arab countries.  Morocco’s willingness to enter into an alliance with Israel 
guided the way for a mutually beneficial relationship that was cultivated for decades. 
Morocco and Israel shared similarities such as preventing the spread of radicalism 
and guaranteeing a reasonable quality of life for their Jewish population.  The two 
countries created a genuine connection that went from a military alliance into a 
partnership for peace.  Although many Jews migrated to Israel in the mid 20th 
century, King Hassan later encouraged them to return to Morocco.  This created an 
industry of tourism and better living conditions for the new Jewish residents.   
 King Hassan played a crucial role in the development of relations between 
parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflicts.  He acted as a moderator between the 
West and Arab regimes. His mediation efforts with Israel did not begin until after the 
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1973 war.  King Hassan was the second leader (after President Sadat of Egypt) to 
engage in relations with Israel.   The king also assisted the United States in 
negotiating peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  King Hassan possessed the 
ability to make alliances with western countries due to his exposure to both cultures. 
One perspective was Moroccan, and the other was European.  Both were equally 
important to him.262  While it has been argued that King Hassan was only friendly to 
United States for military and economic aid, this thesis demonstrates that King 
Hassan’s actions indicated he was true moderator of peace.  
 King Hassan’s remained true to his moderate government and played a role in 
mediating peace between radical and conservative states and with Israel.  This may 
have secured Morocco military aid, but it ultimately improved conditions in the 
country.  King Hassan’s relationship with Israel opened the tourism industry to Jews 
and improved living condition for Jews inside the country.  King Hassan pressed 
Morocco into being one of the forefront Arab countries by attaining peace and 
stability with the Arab states and Israel.  He was a descendent of Prophet Mohammed, 
the commander of the faithful and “the great survivor.”263 He ruled Morocco for over 
38 years and stood true to the motto of the country…God, the country, the King.264  
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Appendix A. 
 
The League of Arab States. 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes Libya form the area known as the 
Maghreb – the north-western most point in Africa.  Arabs constitute a majority in the 
following countries:  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  “The League of Arab States.” Map. Arab Strategies for the Global Era.  
http://arabstrategies.org/Images/ArabRegion/Flags/arab_world.gif. (accessed June 14, 
2007). This map does not contain the Islands of Comoros. 
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Appendix B. 
 
Partition of Morocco under the French and Spanish Protectorates. 
Morocco was divided between Spain and France in 1912.   Spain occupied an area in 
the north and in the south of the country.  The Spanish controlled area in the south is 
located right above the Spanish Sahara.  The city of Tangier (on the northern tip) 
became an international zone in 1923. The majority of the Jewish population resided 
in French Morocco.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Division of Morocco.”  Map.  French Morocco.  http://worldstatesmen.org/ 
colonial_moroc.jpg (accessed June 18, 2007).   
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Appendix C. 
 
Division in the Western Sahara. 
The line down the center of this map represents the fortified wall in the Western 
Sahara. It is over 2,000 kilometers long and divides the country between the 
Moroccan held territory and the Polisario held territory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Division in the Western Sahara.” Map. http://www.msu.edu/  
(accessed July 1, 2007). 
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Appendix D. 
 
The Area of Palestine During the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottomans did not control Palestine as a single unit and the name “Palestine” did 
not appear on the map. The surrounding areas were divided into vilayets (provinces) 
and sanjaks (districts).   
 
 
 
Source: “Palestine under Turkish Rule: 1517-1917”. Map. 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/ottomap.html (accessed 
November 30, 2007).     
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Appendix E. 
 
Map of Palestine 1947.  
This shows the Jewish settlements in Palestine before the creation of the state of 
Israel. 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Jewish Settlements in Palestine.” Map. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/Israel/ (accessed July 21, 2007). 
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Appendix F. 
 
Map of the UN Partition Plan 1947. 
The partition plan was rejected by Arab states.   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “The UN Partition Plan of Palestine.” Map. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/Israel/ (accessed July 21, 2007).  
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Appendix G. 
 
Map of Israel 1949-1967.   
After the 1948 War of Independence, Israel gained territory that was not mandated to 
them in the original UN Partition Plan.   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Israel 1949-1967.” Map. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ 
world/israel/ (accessed July 21, 2007).  
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Appendix H. 
 
Israel After the 1967 War. 
Israel occupied the Golan Heights (Syria), the West Bank (Jordan), the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (Egypt). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Israel After the 1967 War.” Map. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/israel/(accessed July 21 2007).  
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Appendix I. 
 
Jewish Immigration to Israel. 
These tables show the number of Jews that have migrated to Israel since 1948 and 
their country of origin.  Palestine lost the Arab majority and this became a factor in 
hostilities for years to come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Immigrants to Israel.” Table.  http://www.mfa.gov.il/ (accessed November 
9, 2007).  
 
 
Immigrants to Israel by Year of 
Immigration 
1948-1996 
 
1948-1951 688,000 
1952-59 272,000 
1960-69 374,000 
1970-79 346,000 
1980-89 154,000 
1990-1996 737,000 
 
Immigrants to Israel by Continent of 
Origin 
1948-1996 
Europe 58% 
Africa 18% 
Asia 15% 
America & Oceania 8% 
Unknown 1% 
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Appendix J. 
 
Prime Ministers of Israel. 
Israel’s leaders, from the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 to the present.   
 
 
 
 
Prime Ministers of Israel 
 
 
Dates in Office 
David Ben-Gurion 1948-1953 
1955-1963 
Moshe Sharett 1954-1955 
Levi Eshkol 1963-1969 
Golda Meir 1969-1974 
Yitzhak Rabin 1974-1977 
1992-1995 
Menachem Begin 1977-1983 
Yitzhak Shamir 1983-1984 
1986-1992 
Shimon Peres 1984-1986 
1995-1996 
Benjamin Netanyahu 1996-1999 
Ehud Barak 1999-2001 
Ariel Sharon 2001-2006 
Ehud Olmert 2006- to present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “The Prime Ministers of Israel.” Table. http://www.mfa.gov.il/ (accessed 
October 21, 2007).   
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GLOSSARY 
 
Aliyah - series of Jewish emigrations to Israel. Literally meaning “ascending.”  
 
Amir al-Mu’mimin - refers to Commander of the Faithful.  This religious title is given 
to the king of Morocco, both in tradition, and according to the Constitution.   
 
bilad al-makhzan - the central government in Morocco, responsible for paying taxes.  
Can also be transliterated as bled el makhzan. 
 
bilad al-siba - the dissident territory in Morocco, where the central government was 
not established.  Residents were not responsible for paying taxes.  Can also be 
transliterated as bled as siba. 
 
berm - sophisticated sand wall in the Western Sahara.  The wall divides the Western 
Sahara between Moroccan held territory and Polisario held territory.   
 
dahir - a government proclamation or decree.    
 
dhimma - Islamic principle that subjected minorities such as Christians and Jews to 
high taxation and inferior positions.  Also referred to as ahl-al dhimma.   
 
Dhimmi -  a Christian or Jew living in the Islamic state and acknowledging the 
domination of Islam.  The dhimmis were protected by the Sultan.   
 
jizyah -  heavy land and poll tax that was applied to Christians and Jews living under 
Islamic domination.  
 
Makhzan - the central system of government in Morocco, literally meaning 
“storehouse.”    
 
Maghreb -  the Arabic name for the area consisting of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Libya.  Literally meaning “the land of the west.”  Can also be transliterated as  
Maghrib.   
 
mellah - Jewish quarter of a city or town in Morocco. 
 
Moulay - Title of respect, like Lord.  This title is used to address a sultan or sharif 
(noble descent).   Can also be transliterated as mulay or mawlay.  If the person’s name 
is Mohammed, Sidi is used as a title of respect rather than Moulay. 
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sharifian – refers to a person of noble descent, addresses a sultan or sharif, a 
descendent of Prophet Mohammed. 
 
Sultan Mohammed ben Yussef – Ruler of Morocco from 1927 to 1961.  Father of the 
late King Hassan II. Also known as King Mohammed V after 1956.   
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